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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
Over the last decades, the European Union (EU) has developed into a complex set of 
institutions with different decision-making structures and a myriad of different 
interests dispersed over member states, institutions, industries and citizens. One of the 
implications of this complexity is the importance of coordination, or the difficult 
quest to ensure that it is a coherent policy that rolls out of this multifaceted system of 
governance.  
Achieving coherence is an even greater challenge in the area of EU foreign policy 
than in many other policy fields, because the EU’s external affairs are divided over 
different policy paradigms.1  
Nevertheless, a coherent foreign policy is important for the EU. The EU is an 
influential actor on the global stage. It is the world’s largest economy and the world’s 
largest development aid donor. Thus, it is imperative that the EU conducts a coherent 
foreign policy in order to avail itself of the full potential of its international standing.  
In the early 2000s, the need for coherence was increasingly voiced. The Laeken 
Declaration, which would lead to the Convention on the future of Europe, formulated 
a few questions to be addressed by that convention: “How should the coherence of 
European foreign policy be enhanced? How is synergy between the High 
Representative and the competent Commissioner to be reinforced? Should the 
                                   
1 Whereas the largest part of foreign policy, the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), falls under the competence of the member states, other policies with external implications, like 
development, trade, enlargement and neighbourhood   policy, fall under the competences of the 
European Commission. These policies, which are dealt with at the supranational level and belonged to 
the former first pillar, are titled Community (or communautarian) policies. The combined set of 
policies may be referred to as ‘EU foreign policy’.  
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external representation of the Union in international fora be extended further?” 
(Laeken Declaration, 2001).  
The Treaty of Lisbon, which would in 2007 eventually provide the answers to those 
questions, contained a number of far-reaching provisions that were meant to improve 
coherence. Concerning the field of the EU’s foreign policy, the Treaty of Lisbon 
established the position of the High Representative of the Union for Common Affairs 
and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission (HRVP), which would be 
taken on by Baroness Catherine Ashton as from December 2009. Additionally, it 
created a foreign service to support the new HRVP: the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), which would be staffed by former officials from the European 
Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council and the member states’ foreign 
services. The newly established official and service, being part of both the 
intergovernmental and the supranational policy realm, were meant to increase 
coherence in European foreign policy.  Concerning the HRVP, the new treaty stated: 
“The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He 
shall ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action” (Art. 18.4, TEU).  
After a year of negotiations between the member states, the European institutions and 
Catherine Ashton, the EEAS was formally launched in December 2010. Its mandate 
stated:  
 
“The EEAS shall support, and work in cooperation with, the diplomatic services 
of the Member States, as well as with the Gereneral Secretariat of the Council 
and the services of the Commission, in order to ensure consistency between the 
different areas of the Union’s external action and between those areas and its 
other policies (emphasis added)” (Art. 3.1, Council Decision L201). 
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But has the EEAS been able to actually foster the consistency (or: coherence) that is 
referred to? Some have argued that little is to be expected from the EEAS in this 
respect: “While the guiding principles and objectives should lead to an increase in 
coherence, the variety and number of actors involved do raise concerns about 
potential incoherence from the EEAS” (Quinn, 2012, p. 56).  
Yet, as the legal provisions cited above demonstrate, enhancing coherence in 
European foreign policy was one of the most important goals of the HRVP and the 
EEAS.  
The term ‘European foreign policy’ refers to the combination of EU foreign policy 
and the foreign policies of the member states. Therefore, ensuring coherence in 
European foreign policy requires much coordination between different actors and 
policy frameworks. Are the HRVP and the EEAS able to facilitate this coordination? 
The question is particularly interesting when focussing on the EEAS, which employs 
around 3400 staff members, of which more or less 2000 are diplomats, and forms the 
EU’s first ever diplomatic corps. Thus, this thesis will seek to answer the following 
research question:  
 
To what extent has the European External Action Service influenced European 
foreign policy coherence?  
 
I will seek to answer this question while making use of a Principal-Agent theoretical 
perspective.  
The proposed academic endeavour seems relevant: Considering ‘coherence’ from a 
Principal-Agent perspective is a new undertaking. Moreover, although a considerable 
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amount of theoretical work has been produced on the topic of coherence in relation to 
the EEAS or to European foreign policy (Nuttall, 2005; Gebhard, 2011; Furness, 
2011; Quinn, 2012), little research has yet been carried out in an attempt to answer the 
question whether the EEAS has actually lived up to its goals. The reason for this is 
undoubtedly the fact that the EEAS is still a very young institution.  
In fact, at the very same moment that I am writing this thesis, the first EEAS review 
process is in full swing. This process, which is carried out by the member states, the 
European Parliament and the EEAS itself, will present a final report this summer 
(Balfour & Raik, 2013). In a reaction to the input of the European Parliament to this 
review process, Catherine Ashton said during a plenary session of the parliament: 
“Nobody defined any of this, ahead of Lisbon coming into force. So now that we have 
seen the changes and they have bedded down it has become easier to define the 
changes” (Catherine Ashton, 2013). With the present thesis, I hope to provide an 
academic perspective that will contribute to this assessment of the EEAS. 
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1.2. Conceptualising Coherence 
 
1.2.1. Definition of coherence 
Coherence is an abstract and intangible concept that is hard to operationalize. In this 
section, I will provide an academic perspective on the concept of coherence. I will set 
out by touching upon a number of definitions of the concept and shed light on the 
academic debate surrounding the concept. After that, I will formulate the working 
definition that I will use in this thesis. Thirdly, I will present a categorisation of three 
different types of coherence. I will finalize this section by identifying the indicators of 
coherence.  
It might seem a perfectly logical assumption to us that coherence is an important and 
virtuous attribute to any given decision-making entity. Why? Mainly because an 
incoherent policy needs to be avoided, we feel. Because it is hard to pin down a single 
definition of the abstract concept of ‘coherence’, we thus often resort to its opposite to 
make clear what we mean. As Nuttall puts it:  
 
“We should all like our policies and actions to be characterized by consistency, 
if only because the logical alternative is inconsistency, a concept which carries 
almost exclusively negative baggage. Indeed, exhortations to pursue 
consistency, which abound in the EU texts, are as often as not indications that 
someone with an axe to grind, wishes to make a point about inconsistency” 
(Nuttall, 2005, p. 93).  
 
What, then, is coherence itself? Gauttier (2004, p. 40-41) regards coherence as “a 
principle of action and organisation”, by which he refers to the role of coherence in 
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building up the institutional structure of the EU. This classification is also particularly 
useful for giving a general definition of coherence as it acknowledges the double 
nature of the concept. Not only do organisational structures facilitate coherence, as we 
will see at length below, but coherence is also a principle of action: without the active 
pursuit of certain policy objectives, one would never be speaking about coherence.  
Since 1987, the term ‘consistency’ appears in the European treaties. Currently, in the 
consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the most important 
mention of consistency can be found in article 21.3, TEU: 
 
“The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external 
action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the 
Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to 
that effect.” (Treaty on European Union, 2012)  
 
It is appropriate here to explain the difference between the terms ‘consistency’ and 
‘coherence’. The word ‘coherence’ does not appear a single time in the English 
versions of the European treaties. Instead, the word ‘consistency’ is being used. In 
spite of this, the present thesis will use the term ‘coherence’, the reasons for which 
will now be indicated. 
As many authors have noted, there is a linguistic difficulty considering the use of the 
concept of coherence in the treaty texts. Because, whereas the English versions since 
1974 have used the word ‘consistency’, many other languages of the EU chose for the 
‘coherence’ variant: the French version mentions the word ‘cohérence’, the German 
‘Kohärenz’, the Italian ‘coerenza’ and the the Spanish ‘coherencia’. (Cremona, 2008; 
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Gebhard 2011; Hillion, 2008; Nuttall, 2005; Tietje, 1997). Given the fact that these 
words are used in translations of one and the same treaty text, it would be plausible 
that they are interchangeable with ‘consistency’ in English. But is this the case? 
Although a definite answer cannot be given, it seems not to be the case. 
Hillion (2008) supplies a legal argument to prove that ‘coherence’ and ‘consistency’ 
do not refer to the same concept. In a Court of Justice ruling from 2005, considering 
the external relations policy from the Community, Germany and Luxembourg are 
exhorted to “ensure the coherence and consistency of the action and […] international 
representation [of the Community]” Hillion’s argument is that because both terms 
were used next to each other by the Court of Justice, they could not possibly be used 
interchangeably (Hillion, 2008, p. 13). 
Most authors consider consistency to be a more limited term than coherence. 
Consistency refers to the absence of pure contradiction in a literal, and often legal, 
sense. On the other hand, coherence is a broader and more flexible concept. It is a 
matter of degree, instead of a static principle (Cremona, 2008).  Coherence represents 
the process, whereas consistency is focused on the outcome (Gebhard, 2011). 
Coherence does comprise consistency, but it is much more than that. It does not only 
mean the avoidance of contradictions, but also encapsulates synergy and added value 
in the different components of EU policy. Moreover, coherence embodies a process of 
unification, leading up to a “united whole” (Hillion, 2008). Therefore, coherence can 
even be considered a political statement: it implies rapprochement by different actors 
and policy frameworks.  
In this light, it may be clear why I chose for the term ‘coherence’ instead of 
‘consistency’. As the latter term would only entail avoiding legal contradictions in the 
European foreign policy, it would be superfluous going through the trouble of 
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establishing a new autonomous body within the EU structure just to safeguard 
consistency.  
On the contrary, the EEAS was established in order to add positive value to European 
foreign policy. According to Barton (2012, p. 79) it is even one of its main functions 
to “fill the grey zones” between the former pillar structure of the Council and the 
Commission. What the EEAS was pre-eminently established to do was less to avoid 
legal contradictions, a task left to the judiciary, than to ensure synergy and 
complementarity. Hence, the term ‘coherence’.  
Another important property of coherence is that it is closely linked to effectiveness 
(Portela, 2009). The idea is that a governance structure will only be effective if its 
different policies are coherent, because in such a situation the different policies do not 
mitigate each other.  
Perhaps there are also other reasons for the linkage between coherence and 
effectiveness: the concepts of identity and credibility. If actors are engaged in making 
foreign policy, they aim to maintain a clear identity in the international community. 
Maintaining this identity will enable them to define clear values and uniform 
positions on the world stage, and that is of paramount importance for safeguarding 
their interest in the world (Krenzler & Schneider, 1997). In other words, “[c]oherence 
is important for the credibility of the Union as a foreign policy actor…”(Quinn, 2012, 
p. 46).  
The concept of coherence figures more than once in the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). One could argue 
that coherence therefore constitutes an obligation to the European actors. Several 
authors think that this is the case (Gebhard, 2011; Hillion, 2008; Portela, 2009). Not 
only is the principle of coherence mentioned in the treaties, it also forms an essential 
 14 
part of the mandate of the EEAS (Council Decision, 2011). Coherence can thus be 
regarded a positive obligation for all those involved in the process of European 
policymaking. This makes the question whether the EEAS has indeed improved 
coherence even more significant.  
Be that as it may, achieving coherence does not necessarily imply the unification of 
decision-making structures and the complete disappearance of the differing 
institutional focuses, which form a well-established characteristic of the European 
Union. “Coherence does not imply removal of differences between policies and 
institutional structures; rather it is about recognising the differences and ensuring that 
they can live together harmoniously” (Cremona, 2008, p. 32). This is a logical 
contention, because if there would be no differences, there would be no coherence. It 
is exactly this element of coherence that makes it possible to create synergies: after 
taking record of the differences between, say, two policy frameworks, it is possible to 
calculate where elements need to be moderated and where they can act 
complementarily.  
As Gebhard has argued, “the way the ‘requirement’ [of consistency] has so far been 
framed in the treaties determines that while it is legally binding it is not legally 
enforceable” (Gebhard, 2011, p. 114). Gebhard points to Article 3 of the Treaty of 
Nice, which states that the Council and the Commission should fulfil the 
responsibility of coherence ‘each in accordance with its respective powers’. In 
Gebhard’s eyes, this indicates a possibility of incoherence. Moreover, this provision 
does not confer the responsibility of coherence to some sort of arbitrator, a 
“coordinating entity” (Gebhard, 2011). In the current TEU, the article mentioned 
above has been repealed, but its replacement (Article 13, TEU) still calls upon all EU 
institutions to ensure coherence while acting “within the limits of the powers 
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conferred on it in the treaties” (Consolidated version of TEU). Looking at it from this 
perspective, coherence would become more of a normative objective that needs 
consideration from all those who are involved, than a credible obligation. 
Considering all the above, I would propose using the following working definition:  
 
Coherence is a principle of action and organisation implying not only the 
absence of contradictions in primary goals of a set of policies and institutional 
structures, but also the clearness of responsibilities between those policies and 
institutional structures, avoidance of task duplication and presence of a high 
degree of complementarity and synergy.  
 
It is difficult to apply this definition as such to European foreign policy. As the 
external action of the EU is a system of multifaceted governance, comprising different 
actors at different levels, it is sensible to use a categorisation of coherence when we 
want to find out what the state of coherence in European foreign policy-making is.  
We have seen that European foreign policy is the sum of the different foreign policies 
of the 28 member states and the foreign policy made at the level of the EU. The latter 
is at its turn the product of decision-making of all the different EU institutions, but 
mainly the Council and the Commission.  
In this complex system of policy-making, different types of coherence coexist. First, 
the (in)coherence of the different policies of the member states vis-à-vis the policy 
made at EU level. Second, the (in)coherence between the foreign policies of the 
different EU institutions. Third, the coherence between the different foreign policy 
frameworks within the system (e.g. the compatibility between the policy frameworks 
of development cooperation and security). Lastly, there is the coherence of European 
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foreign policy in representation towards the rest of the world. Different authors have 
applied different systems of categorisation to coherence, all undoubtedly suitable to 
the argument of their own academic work.  
Nuttall, who was the first author to design a system of categorisation for coherence, 
introduced the three categories of vertical coherence, horizontal coherence and 
institutional coherence. First, in this system vertical coherence would represent the 
coherence between national policies and the EU. Second, horizontal coherence would 
refer to the coherence between the different EU policies. Third, institutional 
coherence referred to coherence “between the two different bureaucratic apparatuses, 
intergovernmental and supranational, operating in the field of external relations” 
(Nuttall, 2005, p. 97).  
Six years later, Caroline Gebhard modified Nuttall’s system. She used four categories, 
of which only vertical coherence would retain Nuttall’s definition. Gebhard 
abandoned the title of ‘institutional coherence’, but this principle was now renamed 
‘horizontal coherence’ and Nuttall’s old definition of horizontal coherence was not 
used anymore. However, Gebhard did make a distinction between policy substantial 
and procedural horizontal coherence. Gebhard’s third and new category, internal 
coherence, concerns ‘intra-pillar’ coherence: “the sound management within each . . . 
domain [i.e. the intergovernmental and Community domain]” (Gebhard, 2011, p. 
108). Lastly, external coherence is related to the representation of the EU abroad. This 
external coherence is dependent on internal coordination processes and concerns all 
representative elements of European foreign policy: national embassies of the 
member states, EU delegations and Special Representatives.  
For the present study, I have developed a new categorisation that will be taken in 
hand to investigate European foreign policy coherence. This categorisation borrows 
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elements of both earlier divisions. It features vertical coherence, horizontal coherence 
and external coherence. A concise introduction to the categorisation will follow here.   
 
1.2.2. Vertical coherence 
Vertical coherence refers, as was stated above, to the coherence between the 
combined foreign policies of the member states and the foreign policy of the EU. It 
should, however, be noted that the term ‘vertical coherence’ does not imply that a 
hierarchical relationship exists between the member states and the European 
institutions, especially not one placing the European institutions on the upper end. 
After all, the policies of CFSP/EDSP remain essentially intergovernmental.  
Therefore, the member states have retained sovereignty on these issues.  
With regard to real-time action on the international scene, vertical coherence is the 
most important variety of coherence and at the same time the least controllable one at 
EU level. As was stated, CFSP remains essentially a member state competence 
(Comelli & Matarazzo, 2011; Furness, 2011). Even in communautarian policy fields 
like trade or development, member states show a tendency to pursue their own foreign 
policy objectives when large interests are at stake (interview with Mr. Koetsenruijter). 
What is more, the governments of the member states change regularly due to 
elections. Therefore, the character of the foreign policy preferences is often fickle and 
incalculable.  
 
1.2.3. Horizontal Coherence 
In Nuttall’s categorisation, horizontal coherence comprised only the coherence 
between different policy frameworks of the EU. An example of this is the coherence 
between, for example, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU and the 
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development policy of the same European Commission. With Nuttall, institutional 
issues of coherence did not play any role in horizontal coherence. As opposed to this, 
in Gebhard’s system horizontal coherence was only about the coherence between the 
different governance structures of the European institutions, whereas it did not refer to 
coherence between the different policy frameworks. There is a problem with both 
conceptions.  
First, horizontal coherence should relate to the coherence between different policy 
frameworks, regardless of to which institutions these policy frameworks belong. This 
is one of the main concerns in the debate about the coherence of EU external action. 
As Nuttall puts it, “Different issues call forth different policy responses, which need . 
. . to be rendered compatible with each other; different policy-making circles and 
levels produce different answers to the same or similar problems, which need to be 
coordinated.” (Nuttall, 2005, p. 93). That horizontal coherence is important within the 
framework of the EU was also put into words by a communication from the European 
Commission: “As in national administrations, even when there is sufficient political 
will, the EU’s impact falls short when there are unresolved tensions or a lack of 
coherence between different policies.” (European Commission, 2006). However, in 
the current situation it would also be academically incorrect to exclude issues of 
institutional coherence and dedicate an extra category of coherence to these issues. 
Nuttall’s choice to do this is understandable, keeping in mind that the pillar-structure 
had not yet been abolished when he published his article in 2005. However, this did 
happen with the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. Although the main decision-
making procedures and the European institutions stayed more or less the same, it 
would not be correct anymore to speak about ‘inter-pillar coherence’. Besides, 
procedures of foreign policy-making altered considerably with the establishment of 
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the HRVP and the EEAS. For these reasons, it is better to speak about ‘inter-
institutional’ coherence. This leaves more room for interpretation. With regard to 
issues of institutional coherence, the thesis aims to answer the question whether the 
former pillar-structure, which was abolished by the Treaty of Lisbon, has fully 
disappeared or whether it unofficially still exiss in practice.  
Second, Gebhard introduced a category of ‘internal coherence’. In my view, this 
category also pertains to horizontal coherence, as it concerns coherence between 
different policy frameworks at the level of the European Union. A separate category 
is therefore not necessary. Nevertheless, the distinction between (in)coherence that 
crosses the boundary of its own institution and the (in)coherence that occurs within 
one and the same organisation, is useful and interesting. Therefore, I have included a 
subdivision in the category of horizontal coherence. The subcategories are: inter-
institutional horizontal (in)coherence and intra-institutional horizontal (in)coherence. 
The first type occurs, for example, when a policy of the European Commission is 
(in)coherent with a policy of the Council. An example of the second type is when the 
organizational structures within the EEAS would be such that there would be 
duplication of responsibilities between different DGs of this organisation.  
 
1.2.4. External coherence 
Until now, we have only considered internal policy processes within the EU. 
However, arguably the most important part of foreign policy is the actual outward 
action: the fashion in which it presents itself to the outside world.  
It hardly needs explanation that this process is especially relevant in the political 
context of the European Union, which features a multi-level governance system. 
External coherence, then, is the degree to which the European Union is able to use 
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this multi-level governance system to create a strong ‘single voice’ towards the 
outside world. This voice will be expressed through the HRVP, the European 
Delegations to third countries, the European representations at international 
organizations like the UN and, ideally, through the national embassies of the EU 
member states. 
The ‘single voice’ needs to be coherent in order to obtain recognition from the 
international community. Hence, not only the coherence itself is important, but also 
the perception of coherence. According to Nuttall, “it matters a great deal if the 
perception of inconsistency brings the Union into contempt and thereby impairs its 
effectiveness to act” (Nuttall, 2005, 94).  
A sub question that will be addressed by this thesis is:  
 
Which form of coherence has been influenced most by the EEAS: vertical, horizontal 
or external coherence? 
 
1.2.5. Indicators of coherence 
Keeping in mind the above conceptualisation of coherence, we are now able to point 
out a number of indicators of enhanced coherence. These indicators will help us to 
identify coherence in the course of the research.  
As was indicated above, it is easier to resort to incoherence when measuring 
coherence, as a coherent situation is the end goal and as such does not stand out. For 
this reason, a number of the indicators identified below are negations of indicators of 
enhanced incoherence. 
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Indicators of coherence: 
- Unity of bureaucratic cultures (Gebhard, 2011) 
- Unity in external representation (Gebhard, 2011) 
- Absence of inter-institutional turf wars 
- Absence of duplication of responsibilities 
- ‘Sense of coherence’ of the respondents of the interviews conducted for this 
research.  
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1.3. Literature Review 
As it is the goal of this thesis to approach the EEAS’s ability to influence European 
foreign policy coherence from a Principal-Agent (PA) perspective, there are several 
relevant schools of literature that I have consulted. While part of the literature focuses 
specifically on the EEAS, other relevant contributions focus on: institutional 
arrangements of European foreign policy, the concept of coherence in European 
foreign policy or PA theory in general. In this section, I will give a concise overview 
of literature that has been instrumental for my research.  
Nickolas Cherrier uses a game-theoretical approach to explore how the EEAS has 
changed foreign policy formation in the EU. Cherrier argues that because of the 
information that she receives from the EEAS staff, the HRVP can play a crucial 
agenda-setting and coalition-forming role. Accordingly, it becomes relatively 
affordable for the HRVP to initiate foreign policy proposals. The member states, 
however, incur high costs when investing in a high investment strategy during the 
negotiations. Therefore, according to Cherrier, both member states and the EU benefit 
from the EEAS. 
Vicky Reynaert comes to an entirely different conclusion. Investigating, like the 
present thesis, whether the EEAS has improved foreign policy coherence, she argues 
that the negotiations on the establishment of the EEAS were characterized by ‘hard 
bargaining’, with actors like the Commission and the member states unwilling to give 
up any of their own foreign policy competences. She draws the conclusion that the 
negotiations impaired the EEAS as an actor, thereby only complicating the 
institutional nature of European foreign policy-making and not leading to increased 
coherence. 
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Perhaps the largest academic endeavour undertaken on the topic of the EEAS is the 
research by Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik. They have conducted research on the 
relations between the national governments of the EU member states and the EEAS. 
Their empirical evidence is drawn from fourteen separate case studies on different 
member states. One of their main findings is that the EU member states are divided 
into two camps, mainly between the larger and the smaller member states. Moreover, 
they emphasize that the foreign policy preferences of the member states will not 
change because of the European framework they are operating in. Member states keep 
‘uploading’ the same issues to the European negotiation tables.  
According to Michael Smith, the Treaty of Lisbon has not changed the fact that 
European external relations are still divided between two fundamentally different 
policy paradigms since the Treaty of Maastricht: the intergovernmental and the 
supranational ones. His argument is that the pillar-structure has implicitly survived 
the Treaty of Lisbon. According to Smith: “[the EU’s external relations] can be 
adapted to changing circumstances without losing their essentially hydrid nature” 
(Smith, 2012, p. 713). 
In the area of PA theory, Mark Furness’s contribution focuses exclusively on the 
EEAS. He argues that the EEAS can exploit the differences among its many 
principals, but that the principals will not let the EEAS represent them fully on the 
international stage. Moreover, Furness predicts that the agent autonomy of the EEAS 
will vary in its different policy areas. He poses the possibility that the EEAS becomes 
a ‘double actor’, functioning in two paradigms: policy areas where it can wield little 
agent autonomy versus policy areas where it has leeway to augment its autonomy and 
cooperate freely with the Commission.   
 24 
Michele Comelli and Raffaello Matarazzo have focused on the role of the European 
delegations and how this role has changed in nature since the Treaty of Lisbon. In 
their eyes, the main function of the delegations is to formulate common EU positions 
in third countries. To this end, close collaboration with the member states embassies 
in a third country is imperative. Comelli and Matarazzo’s main point is that these 
intimate contacts construct a ‘common institutional structure’ that will lead to 
Europeanization and an esprit de corps under European diplomats abroad.  
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1.4. Principal-Agent theory  
The focal point of Principal-Agent (PA) theory is explaining the relationship between 
two (sets of) actors: the principal(s) and the agent(s). A precondition, in this respect, 
is that there is delegation of power from the principal to the agent. 
PA theory did not come into being as a political science approach. The theory was 
developed by economists, who sought to explain the business relationship between 
the capital owner (the principal) and the business manager (the agent) of an 
enterprise. The purpose of PA theory was to explore ways to prevent the business 
manager from pursuing his personal motives, instead of keeping in mind the interests 
of the capital owner. (Dür & Elsig, 2011, p. 328).  
Later, since the 1980s, PA theory was adopted by political scientists and applied to 
relationships between actors in national and international politics. A primary example 
of a PA relationship in national politics is the relationship between the electorate (the 
principals) and the parliament (the agent). Since the 1990s, a considerable number of 
scholarly contributions have studied the different facets of EU politics from a PA 
perspective (Dür & Elsig, 2011, p. 328). 
The starting point of a PA theoretical analysis is exploring the reasons that inspired 
the principal to delegate authority to the agent. The question why principals delegate 
authority is especially interesting when considering international organizations, 
because the theory might help explain why international organizations emerge in 
global politics.  
A considerable tension in the relationship between the principal and the agent is 
caused by so-called ‘agency slippage’2. Agency slippage happens when an agent, 
                                   
2 In the literature, different terms are used for the concept of ‘agency slippage’, such as ‘agency 
shirking’, ‘agency losses’ or ‘bureaucratic drifting’.  
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acting independently of the principal, develops its own agenda and starts pursuing its 
own goals, which may run counter to the principal’s preferences.  
In fact, it is an assumption of PA theory that agents, once authority has been delegated 
to them, will show agency slippage. In most instances, the agent, being active in the 
field, has better access to information and networks than the principal. Thus, it can 
“exploit information asymmetry about the available options for action and take steps 
that harm the interests of the principal with minimal costs to itself” (Furness, 2011, p. 
6).  
An interesting topic is the relationship between agency slippage and agent autonomy. 
In the literature, both concepts are treated as being equal. After all, agency slippage 
takes place when “an agent can carve out an autonomous position for itself” (Furness, 
2011, p. 5). However, agency slippage and agent autonomy are not exactly the same. 
Although an agent needs a small degree of autonomy even to be able to start the 
agency slippage process, autonomy will above all be the result of agency slippage. 
We may, however, assume that when agency slippage takes place, the autonomy of an 
agent is thus also increasing.   
In spite of agency slippage, principals do have incentives to delegate authority to 
agents. Most frequently, agents can perform tasks cheaper than when the principal 
would have to undertake them by own means. A number of much-cited benefits of 
delegation of power to agents are: specific agent expertise, the creation of economies 
of scale through specialization, but also increasing credibility, locking in domestic 
reform and enhancing collective decision-making (Dür & Elsig, 2011, p. 329).  
Furthermore, the principals do have tools at hand to control agency slippage. The 
principal can apply control mechanisms to agents, in order to stop agency slippage. 
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The literature makes mention of two types of controls: ex ante controls and ex post 
controls.  
Ex ante controls are determined before the actual agent is created, i.e. before the 
principal delegates its power to the agent. The most obvious way to administer ex ante 
controls is the mandate of the agent. By creating the mandate, the principal inserts ex 
ante controls into the very institutional set-up of the agent. Examples are the 
procedures that agents must follow, the frequency with which it should brief the 
principal and the oversight procedures that will ensure ex post controls. It is not 
always possible to apply ex ante controls, because although the relationship between a 
principal and an agent does presume the existence of a certain ‘contract’, this contract 
need not be explicit or legalized (Drieskens, 2008). Therefore, an official mandate 
may not always be present.  
Typical examples of ex post controls are monitoring and sanctions. According to Lane 
(2005) monitoring is imperative in order to limit damaging agency slippage. Only 
with monitoring can the bureaucracy of the agent be pushed out of a suboptimal 
position.  
In spite of all this, putting ex ante and ex post controls in practice may also be 
disadvantageous to the principal. Indeed, implementing control mechanisms can be 
costly in two ways: first, it may considerably restrict the agent in performing its tasks. 
Second, monitoring and applying sanctions costs money and labour (Furness, 2011). 
Therefore, while deciding on the controls, the principal must balance the 
disadvantages of agency slippage to the disadvantages of controls.  
Another instrument through which principals can mitigate the negative effects of 
agency slippage is called ‘agent shopping’. When more than one agent is present in 
the institutional framework of the PA relationship, then principals might, in day to 
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day politics, choose to entrust tasks to another agent they can rely on. An example is 
formed by agricultural trade negotiations powers, that were delegated to DG 
Agriculture instead of DG Trade of the European Commission (Dür & Elsig, 2011).   
 
1.4.1. Factors that foster agency slippage 
It is relevant to identify factors that facilitate agency slippage, for identifying these 
factors in a given situation will enable us to predict the likeliness of agency slippage 
(and therefore agent autonomy) of the EEAS. 
Self-evident as it may be, the number and depth of the competences awarded to the 
agent is important for its potential to augment its autonomy. This is true both for 
procedural competences, such as the right to communicate directly with clients, and 
for an extension of competences on different policy fields. The European Commission 
forms a lighting example of how competences on more policy fields gave the 
organization more autonomy through the expertise that it developed in these areas. 
Moreover, the Commission made sure to swiftly gain expertise on the issues within its 
competences, thereby also shaping the preferences of its principals: the member states 
(Niemann & Huigens, 2011).  
The agent’s competences are naturally closely related to its mandate. The mandate 
itself is also a factor that can contribute to agency slippage, but in a specific way. 
Conceição-Heldt has argued that the agent can win considerable autonomy when its 
mandate is vague. “If principals give the agent a vague mandate, this increases the 
agent’s discretion and room for manoeuvre at the international level to interpret the 
negotiating guidelines and to make further concessions and to move closer to the 
position of third countries” (Conceição-Heldt, 2011, p. 413). Hence, the vaguer the 
mandate, the more room for agency slippage.  
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Another element that influences the agent’s autonomy is the number of principals that 
are involved in the PA relationship (Furness, 2011). When there are multiple 
principals involved, the control function is likely to be dispersed over more principals 
and therefore less stringently exercised. What is more, with a higher number of 
principals present, it becomes more likely that the preferences of the principals 
diverge from one another. In such a situation, the principals themselves will grant 
more authority to the agent, to serve as an arbitrary mechanism to a certain degree 
(Conceição-Heldt, 2011). Conceição-Heldt conducted a study on the degree of 
autonomy that the European Commission as an agent of the European member states 
enjoyed during negotiations at the Doha Round. She concludes  “that preference 
heterogeneity with two camps of nearly equal size . . ., a vague negotiating mandate 
and conflicting messages from principals gave the Commission a higher level of 
discretion in multilateral trade negotiations” (Conceição-Heldt, 2011, p. 415-416). 
Another driving force behind agency slippage is information asymmetry. Frequently, 
the agent has much better and more direct access to information from the field of 
play, as it is involved in the day to day process there. The more information it can 
gather, the more the agent will be able to engage in agency slippage (Dür & Elsig, 
2011).  
Quite logically, the amount of resources that the agent disposes of is also a 
determining factor in the agent’s ability to increase its autonomy. More resources 
allow the agent to perform its tasks better, which will in turn make it easier for the 
other actors to accept the wielding of its increased authority. (Niemann & Huigens, 
2011).  
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1.4.2. PA theory and European foreign policy 
PA theory seems to be a particularly suitable theory to explain power relationships in 
the European Union, because of its ability to explain the processes present in the EU’s 
plural government structure in a simple way. A great amount of actors are involved in 
EU decision-making. Moreover, these actors all have diverging stature: some are 
states, other European institutions or, yet another category, lobby and interests groups. 
“To cut through so much organised complexity one would wish to employ a simple 
analytical approach which identifies the key players in an interaction and classifies 
them as either principal or agent” (Lane, 2005, p. 30). That is exactly what PA theory 
does.  
Since the 1990s PA insights were frequently applied to the EU, for instance to 
conceptualize the delegation of power from the member states to the European 
institutions (Drieskens, 2008).  
Within the EU, many PA relationships are assignable. At present, I will limit myself 
to the most important delegation chains in the EU’s foreign policies. The European 
electorate makes up the first set of principals. They delegate power to the different 
national parliaments of the member states. These parliaments also perform a role as 
principal, when they on their turn delegate powers to their governments. The 
governments bring their power along to the European negotiation tables in Brussels, 
at the European Council and the Council of the EU. There they jointly determine the 
CFSP and ESDP of the EU. Besides, on the field of external relations concerning 
former first pillar policies like trade or development, they delegate powers to the 
European Commission.  
A separate PA relationship exists between the European voters and the European 
Parliament. (Dür & Elsig, 2011). The European Parliament, being the agent of the 
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European citizens, is a principal of the Commission, as it has powers of co-decision 
on a number of policy areas. Owing to the Treaty of Lisbon, the European 
Parliament’s powers have increased. Still, the powers of the Parliament are relatively 
weak compared to the relationship between the member states and the Commission 
(Dür & Elsig, 2011).  Now, we have a basic understanding of the institutional 
landscape in which the EEAS was established. It is time to consider the PA 
relationships in which this new agency is involved. 
The member states are the main principals of the EEAS. They delegate authority to 
the HRVP and the EEAS via three PA relationships: the European Council, the 
Council of the EU and directly from a national level. The Council of Ministers forms 
the most important principal of the EEAS. It makes the largest part of the decisions 
that are to be implemented by the EEAS. Moreover, the decisions that the Council of 
Ministers take on behalf of the member states governments are much more detailed 
and instructive than the broad guidelines and principles that the European Council 
formulates.  
Apart from the member states, the EEAS also receives authority from the European 
Commission, although its main foreign policy competences were taken away and 
transferred to the EEAS. However, on a number of policy areas the member states 
have delegated supranational powers to the Commission. Some of these areas of 
competence (the former first pillar policies) have important external relations 
implications, such as trade, development, enlargement, neighbourhood policy and the 
environment. The external dimensions of these policies still fall under the competence 
of the Commission, but the latter has to cooperate with the EEAS on these matters for 
reasons of coherence. Therefore, the Commission may also be considered a principal 
of the agent ‘EEAS’. 
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Between the European Parliament and the EEAS, a weak PA relationship exists. The 
only real competence of the European Parliament over the EEAS concerns the latter’s 
budget. Yet, on an informal basis the opinion of the European Parliament is of 
considerable value to the HRVP. The main channels of delegation will look thus 
(dotted lines denote weak PA-relationships): 
 
 
Figure 1: PA relationships in European foreign policy decision-making. 
 
Considering the above, it may be concluded that the EEAS is an agent with many 
principals. An interesting question in this respect is whether agency slippage within 
the EEAS will vary across policy areas due to difference in principals. This is what 
Furness (2011, p. 24) assumes: “The prospect for agency slippage is likely to be 
higher in development policy than in CFSP or CDSP because the Commission acts as 
a principal in this policy area.” His argument is that the Commission is already 
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accustomed to sharing responsibilities (formerly, directly with the member states) in a 
policy area like development cooperation.  
Nonetheless, the author doubts that Furness’ assumption will hold ground because of 
the notorious reputation of the European Commission to protect its competences. The 
negotiation process on the EEAS showed no less, as will be shown in chapter 3 of this 
thesis. 
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1.5. Independent variables & hypotheses 
Before starting the core analysis of this thesis, it is sensible to introduce a set of 
relevant independent variables of which a correlation with European foreign policy is 
expected. The previous section, which explained the theoretical framework of this 
study, clarifies the rationale behind choosing most of the independent variables.  
The primary independent variable of this study is agency slippage. It is believed that 
a higher degree of agency slippage for the EEAS leads to more European foreign 
policy coherence. This contention is based upon two assumptions: First, that agency 
slippage leads to agent autonomy. As is shown in the previous section, this 
assumption may be deemed correct. The second assumption is that more agent 
autonomy leads to more coherence in European foreign policy. This latter assumption 
is a rather more problematic one. For, how can we be sure that the EEAS is even 
capable of producing coherent policies?  
The answer to this question is that the EEAS’ place in the institutional landscape of 
Brussels, situated (physically and institutionally) in the middle between the 
Commission and the Council and standing under the authority of a ‘double hatted’ 
HRVP, makes it only natural for the EEAS to ensure coherence when its role would 
grow. As a matter of fact, some have characterized the goal of the EEAS to act as a 
kind of ‘mediator’ between the Commission and the Council (Barton, 2012). In PA 
theory, it is a rule that once a new bureaucracy is created, it will pursue more power 
and responsibilities for itself. With the institutional set-up the EEAS has, more power 
to this organization would automatically entail enhanced European foreign policy 
coherence, as more input from the EEAS would mean more input not only into the 
foreign policies of the member states but also into those of the Commission and 
Council secretariat. In this sense, coherence is automatically generated. The question 
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whether the EEAS has enhanced European foreign policy coherence is thence 
equivalent to the question whether the EEAS has been given enough space to function 
well.  
The second independent variable is the depth and number of EEAS competences, 
essentially comprising ex ante controls and ex post controls of the principals on the 
EEAS. As we have seen, controls can play a role in constraining an agent to a 
considerable degree.  
The third independent variable is closely related to the last one. It concerns the depth 
and number of competences of the HRVP. The HRVP, having full authority over 
the EEAS, can exert much influence on the functioning of the organisation.  
Again closely related to the foregoing is the mandate of the EEAS, which will also 
serve as an independent variable. It is an important factor in determining the outcome 
of European foreign policy coherence, as a vague mandate may cause agency 
slippage. 
The next independent variable is the number of principals. As we have seen, a 
larger number of principals may result in more autonomy for the agent. Related to this 
idea, was the concept of interest heterogeneity between the principals.  
Another independent variable is the presence of information asymmetry between the 
principals and the agent.  
Until present, all independent variables were inspired by PA theory. However, it 
seems sensible to add a small number of other independent variables, as I expect that 
they have a correlation with the potential of the EEAS to enhance European foreign 
policy coherence.  
Firstly, there is the provenance of the personnel of the EEAS. As will be explained 
in the next chapter, the EEAS’ personnel is made up of different groups of officials, 
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among whom seconded national diplomats, seconded national experts, former 
Commission staff and former Council staff. As seconded national diplomats return to 
the service of their own ministry of foreign affairs after having spent a few years at 
the EEAS, it might be expected that their time as EEAS official might influence the 
way they, and their colleagues with whom they socialise, look upon European foreign 
policy issues. Moreover, more seconded national diplomats among the staff of the 
EEAS could create an esprit de corps at the EEAS, through which national diplomats 
exchange the best practices of their member states. This could very well influence 
vertical coherence, as it could possibly create a veritable ‘European diplomatic 
culture’.  
Secondly, institutionalisation is an important factor to consider as well. It signifies 
the degree of recognition the EEAS receives from other actors in the field, and also 
from third country actors. Therefore, an important element of institutionalisation is 
‘international standing’. Institutionalisation awards the EEAS more credibility and 
therefore more authority to operate on the international stage, which would probably 
foster external coherence considerably (Bátora, 2011).  
Applying the independent variables to PA theory leads to the formulation of a number 
of theorem’s concerning the EEAS’ capability to enhance European foreign policy: 
 
Theorem 1 
The extension of the competences of the EEAS and the HRVP is positively correlated 
with the agent autonomy of the EEAS and the degree to which it can foster coherence. 
Therefore, the application of ex-ante and ex-post controls by the EEAS’ principals 
would constrain its potential to establish more European foreign policy coherence.  
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Theorem 2 
A clear-cut, legalized mandate will constrict the agent “EEAS” more than a vague 
mandate, which is more open to interpretation for the agent itself. Therefore, the 
vaguer the mandate, the more the EEAS will be able to enhance coherence.  
 
Theorem 3 
A higher degree of interest heterogeneity among the principals, will lead to more 
agent autonomy for the EEAS, and thus to more European foreign policy coherence. 
 
Theorem 4 
The amount of resources available to the agent is positively correlated with the level 
of the agent’s autonomy and therefore its capacity to foster coherence. 
 
Theorem 5 
More diversity in the provenance of the personnel of the EEAS will lead to more 
coherence. 
 
Theorem 6 
The more institutional standing and international recognition the EEAS has been able 
to rally for itself, the more power it will have as an agent and the more, therefore, it 
will be able to advance foreign policy coherence.  
 
The identification of these theorems has incurred a number of hypotheses concerning 
the influence of the EEAS on European foreign policy. They are listed here: 
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Hypothesis 1 
The staff of the EEAS has very diverse origins, as it is made up of former personnel 
from the Commission, former personnel from the Council and seconded national 
diplomats. This diversity will predominantly enhance the EEAS’ potential to foster 
vertical coherence in European foreign policy, as it is to be expected that seconded 
national diplomats keep in contact with their home governments. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The foreign policy preferences of the member states may be expected to vary 
considerably. The EEAS is expected to benefit from this interest heterogeneity among 
its principals, enabling it to augment its agent autonomy and foster vertical coherence 
in European foreign policy.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
There will be more agency slippage in areas where no supranational authority has yet 
been delegated to the Commission, because the Commission as a bureaucracy will do 
anything to protect its domain. Therefore, it will be easier for the EEAS to engage in 
agency slippage and thus enlarge its autonomy on CFSP matters than on former first 
policy issues.  
 
Hypothesis 4 
External representation is a competence that the member states most likely associate 
with their national sovereignty. Therefore, it is not likely that they will transfer 
enough competences to the EEAS to make external coherence a success.  
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Hypothesis 5 
As two of the hypotheses formulated above expect vertical coherence to be enhanced, 
whereas the other two have negative expectations for horizontal and external 
coherence, it may be expected that vertical coherence will be the form of coherence 
that is enhanced most by the EEAS. 
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1.6. Method of analysis and data collection 
 
Method of analysis 
The empirical research of this study will rely on process-tracing, because this method 
offers the most fruitful procedure to discover causal relationships between its 
independent variables and its dependent variable.  
As George and Bennett (2005) have shown, process-tracing is a useful method for 
testing theories when focusing only on a single case. By examining a diverse set of 
sources pertaining to the case under investigation, it explores the various steps of a 
causal process maintained by a theory. The goal is to find out whether a proposed 
theoretical hypothesis is evident in the sequence of a case (George & Bennett, 2005).  
For my study, the single case under investigation is that of the EEAS. The theory that 
I propose to test is PA theory. In line with the practice of process-tracing, I will do 
this by considering what influence the different independent variables, such as the 
number of competences of the EEAS and the provenance of its personnel, have had 
on the indicators of coherence that we defined in one of the previous sections.  
 
Data collection 
During the course of research for this thesis, I have conducted interviews with thirteen 
officials. To ensure an unbiased representation of professional opinions, it was my 
goal to interview a set of interview respondents with different professional 
backgrounds, constituting a balance between, on the one hand, the institutions and, on 
the other hand intergovernmental or supranational inclination. To this end, I 
formulated a number of guidelines to which the list of interview respondents had to 
correspond .  
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First, it was my purpose to interview at least one respondent of all the relevant 
institutions for European foreign policy: the European Parliament, the European 
Commission, the Council of the EU3, a ministry of foreign affairs of a member state, 
and of course the EEAS itself.  
A second objective concerned exclusively the EEAS staff to be interviewed. As the 
current body of EEAS staff is made up of former EU officials and seconded national 
diplomats from the member states, I reckoned it to be a good idea to achieve an equal 
balance between these two groups. See table 1 for an overview of the respondents for 
my research.  
                                   
3 I interviewed a member of the ANTICI group, who officially works for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, but is closely involved in Council procedures.  
No.  
 
Name 
 
Institution Provenance 
(EEAS) 
Function/Policy Area 
 
1. Mr. Koetsenruijter EEAS European 
Commission 
Head of Divison 
MERCOSUR countries 
2. Mr. Sohlstrom EEAS National Expert Development Cooperation 
3. Mr. Gerbrandij EEAS National  
Expert 
Development Cooperation 
 
4. 
 
Mr. Fernández -
Mazarambroz y de 
Arespochaga 
 
EEAS 
 
National  
Expert 
 
Development Cooperation 
5. Mr. Pulch EEAS Seconded by 
German MFA 
Head of Division Russia 
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Table 1: Interview respondents for the research leading up to this thesis.  
 
 
                                   
4 Three of the interview respondents preferred to remain anonymous. 
6. Mr. Houttuin EEAS Seconded by  
Dutch MFA 
Trade 
7. A policy officer of the 
EEAS4 
EEAS x x 
8. A policy officer of the 
EEAS 
EEAS x x  
9. Mr. Tibbels EEAS European 
Commission 
Head of Division Regional 
Cooperation, OSCE and 
Eastern Partnership 
10. An official of the 
ministry of foreign 
affairs of the 
Netherlands 
Dutch MFA  Direction for European 
Integration 
11. Ms. Gregoire Dutch MFA 
(Perm. 
Representation to 
the EU) 
 Member of ANTICI Group 
at the Council of the EU 
12. Mr. Van Baalen European 
Parliament 
 Member of European 
Parliament, member of 
AFET Committee. 
13. Ms. Peresso European 
Commission 
 Cabinet of Trade 
Commissioner De Gught 
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The interviews explored the following range of issues: 
• Organisational set-up of the EEAS. 
• The role of the Delegations. 
• Inter-institutional relations. 
• Intra-institutional relations.  
• The perceived enhancement of vertical, horizontal and/or external coherence. 
• A common culture among the personnel of the EEAS. 
• Member states’ preferences in European foreign policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
2. The agent: the EEAS 
 
2.1. HRVP      
Every analysis of the EEAS starts with an analysis of the HRVP. Without the HRVP, 
the EEAS would not have right of existence: the treaties delegate authority to the 
HRVP, not to the organisation supporting him/her. 
As Cherrier has remarked quite accurately, “Baroness Ashton is a unique kind of 
‘super-agent’ in that her office forms the link between the various principals and the 
EEAS” (Furness, 2011, p. 15). This phrase offers a useful description of the relations 
between the different actors involved: Formally, the HRVP forms the ‘institution’ 
with foreign policy powers, as opposed to the EEAS. However, the power relationship 
between the HRVP and the EEAS is reciprocal: the EEAS provides the HRVP with 
all the tools she needs to execute her responsibilities. Through the extensive network 
of EU Delegations and the policy made by the EEAS staff, she is empowered to do 
her functions. Therefore, it has been argued that the EEAS and the HRVP are “two 
sides of the same puzzle” (Cherrier, 2012, p. 1).   
With respect to foreign policy coherence, the creation of the HRVP is the single most 
important innovation of the Treaty of Lisbon (Quinn, 2012). Much of the literature 
contributes the coordination potential of the HRVP to her ‘double-hatted’ nature 
(Quinn, 2012; Cherrier, 2012; Furness, 2011). However, it may be argued that the 
HRVP actually has a ‘triple hatted’ function, as she essentially combines the functions 
of the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy, the 
Vice-President of the Commission and the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council 
(Duff, 2009). The combination of these functions makes her a very powerful agent.  
First of all, as the High Representative, she is the EU’s highest ranking diplomat and 
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in charge of the EU’s representation in third countries and at international 
organizations and conferences (Art. 27.2, TEU). In this manner, the position of HRVP 
brings unity in external representation. This part of the HRVP’s function could be 
brought in line with ‘external coherence’, as it concerns the external representation of 
the EU. Still, one should not forget the positions of the President of the European 
Council and the President of the Commission, who also have functions with external 
representation implications, albeit less defined. More on this topic will be said in 
chapter 6.  
Second, the fact that the HRVP is the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council with 
the right to initiate legislation endows her with considerable agenda setting powers 
over the most important forum of member states concerned with foreign policy-
making. This ‘hat’ of the HRVP could be brought in line with ‘vertical coherence’, as 
it primarily concerns her contacts with the member states. 
Third, as the External Relations Commissioner/Vice-President of the Commission she 
also has the right to initiate legislation on external affairs policies of the former first 
pillar (Furness, 2011). This part of the function of HRVP, lastly, could be aligned 
with ‘horizontal coherence’ as it concerns a bridging function between the 
Commission and the EEAS.  
However, the HRVP has even more roles than described here. As she is the British 
member of the Commission, she also has a national advocacy role in that institution. 
Moreover, as the head of the EU’s foreign service, she is responsible for diplomatic 
and military operations (Furness, 2011).  
Accordingly, the HRVP has a very extensive function. Perhaps it is simply too 
extensive for one person to execute adequately (Quinn, 55). Before the establishment 
of the HRVP, her role was executed by three different persons. Merging these three 
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functions into one office means that the official executing the office needs an 
extensive supporting bureaucracy (the EEAS). Moreover, he or she will have to 
prioritize, as one person cannot be in three places at the same time (interview with 
Pulch).  
Therefore, an important question during the set-up of the EEAS was who can deputize 
for the HRVP. The European Parliament insisted that the deputies of the HRVP 
would be politically accountable. Currently however, the HRVP has no politically 
accountable deputies apart from the foreign ministers of the member states, who may 
deputize for her under special circumstances.  
Therefore, the HRVP has had to prioritize. In the case of Catherine Ashton, the HRVP 
has spent more time on representing the EU abroad by attending international 
conferences and visiting third countries than on coordination foreign policy within the 
EU. To nurture better horizontal coordination, it would be wise to exploit the role of 
Vice-President better (interview with Tibbels).  
Moreover, it is also a widely carried opinion that Catherine Ashton is relatively low-
profile political figure in comparison to the heavy and symbolic function of HRVP 
(Castle & Erlanger 2009).  
It has been assumed that the EEAS is secondary to the HRVP, in that its success can 
only be judged by the effectiveness of the HRVP (Gross & Rotta, 2011). However, in 
the eyes of the author such a contention is flawed for it negates the importance of the 
organizational structure of the agent EEAS. Moreover, the concept of agency slippage 
implies that an agent can increase its own role and wrestle itself from the hold of its 
institutional environment.  
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2.2. Mandate of the EEAS  
The mandate of the EEAS essentially consists of the provisions taken up in the 
Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS of 26 
July 2010. In the treaties, the only mention of the EEAS is article 27.3 TEU: 
 
“In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a 
European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with 
the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from 
relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the 
Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the 
Member States. . .” (Art. 27.3 TEU) 
 
Therefore, the Council Decision is the most comprehensive legal basis of the EEAS, 
in which all details about process and scope are outlined. The document comprises 
eleven pages and determines, among other things, the organisation’s tasks, staff, 
budget and relations with different institutions.  
A first relevant aspect in the mandate concerns the very identity of the EEAS. Article 
1.2. states: 
 
“The EEAS, which has its headquarters in Brussels, shall be a functionally 
autonomous body of the European Union, separate from the General Secretariat 
of the Council and from the Commission with the legal capacity necessary to 
perform its tasks and attain its objectives” (Art. 1.2. Council Decision L201).  
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The EEAS, then, is a “functionally autonomous body”. This means that it is not a 
European institution.  
What, then, is the status of the EEAS? EU officials refer to the EEAS as a ‘service’. 
One interview respondent who works for the Commission even referred to the EEAS 
as a ‘DG’ (interview with Peresso). However, although the service does not have any 
powers conferred on it by the EU treaties, “it is more than just an agency with 
external policy responsibilities” (Furness, 2011, p. 16). The large scope of foreign 
policy matters handled by the EEAS and its comprehensive relations with actors like 
the Council and the Commission will probably cause the EEAS to be looked upon as 
a species of institution after all. Nevertheless, the organisation does not have the 
competence to take binding administrative decisions (Furness, 16). This constrains the 
competences of the EEAS.  
The Council Document shows the signs of the hard bargaining that took place during 
the negotiations on the EEAS. Many of the tasks stated in the document still fall 
under the remit of the Commission. In fact, the indicator duplication of tasks and 
responsibilities is ingrained in the text. Consider article 2.1.: 
 
“The EEAS shall support the High Representative . . . in his/her capacity as 
Vice-President of the Commission for fulfilling within the Commission the 
responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations, and in coordinating other 
aspects of the Union’s external action, without prejudice to the normal tasks of 
the services of the Commission (emphasis added)” (Art. 2.1., Council Decision 
L201).5 
 
                                   
5 Article 2.1. of the Council Decision contains a similar provision concerning the tasks of the Council 
General Secretariat.  
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This provision risks a substantial overlap of mandate, for it is open to interpretation 
where the ‘normal tasks’ of the Commission begin and end. In line with PA-theory it 
may be expected that the Commission will set the limits of its normal tasks quite 
amply.  
Furthermore, the Commission remains in charge of a significant share of the 
budgetary arrangements of the EEAS: 
 
“. . . The High Representative shall adopt the internal rules for the management 
of the administrative budget lines. Operational expenditure shall remain within 
the Commission section of the budget” (Art. 8.1., Council Decision L201). 
 
And, not less significant:  
 
“. . . the EEAS shall draw up estimates of its expenditure for the following 
financial year. The Commission shall consolidate those estimates in a draft 
budget, which may contain different estimates. The Commission may amend the 
draft budget as provided for in Article 314(2) TFEU” (Art. 8.4., Council 
Decision L201).  
 
The provisions quoted above show that there is considerable overlap of competences 
and that inter-institutional rivalry is ingrained in the very mandate of the EEAS. 
Especially the fact that the Commission has large powers over the EEAS’ operational 
budget may be the cause of inter-institutional turf wars.  
Furness has called the Council Decision establishing the EEAS an “incomplete 
contract in that it provides a broad framework but leaves all important process-related 
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details to be bedded in over the next few years” (Furness, 2011 p. 25). I disagree with 
the contention that the Council Decision would constitute a vague mandate. On the 
contrary, the Council Decision is quite detailed in summarising the foreign policy 
competences of the EEAS and the other European actors. Admitted, it does not make 
extensive mention of the procedures to be deployed by the EEAS. Nevertheless, the 
freedom of interpretation it leaves on procedural issues is compensated fully by the 
detailed nature of the reference to the different competences. Once the areas of 
competence are quite meticulously delimited, the processes subsequently have less 
space of manoeuvre to influence the power of the EEAS.  
An example of the detailed nature of the Council Decision can be article 9, which sets 
out the division of competences between the Commission and the EEAS on external 
action instruments and programming. This article, which is too lengthy to quote here, 
enumerates all financial programming instruments and specifies the division of labour 
between the Commission and the EEAS on all of them, particularising which of both 
actors should draw up country allocation documents and strategy papers.  
Consequently, it is fair to state that the EEAS does not suffer from a vague mandate. 
However, it does suffer from a rather restrictive mandate. The EEAS’ number of 
competences could have been much larger, had it not been for the hard bargaining 
process during negotiations on the service. More about information about the 
bargaining process will be given in the next chapter. 
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2.3. Personnel of the EEAS 
The body of EEAS personnel is made up of three different ‘blood groups’: former 
Council personnel, former Staff personnel and seconded diplomats from the member 
states’ foreign services. Article 6.10 of the Council Decision states that “[w]hen the 
EEAS has reached its full capacity, staff from Member States . . . should represent at 
least one third of all EEAS staff at AD level” (Article 6.10, Council Decision L201). 
Currently, the EEAS employs 308 national diplomats versus 627 EU officials at AD 
level, which produces a percentage of member state diplomats of 32,9%. As such, the 
EEAS complies exactly with Article 6.10 of the Council Decision.  
From the Council, the entire former Policy Unit was transferred to the EEAS when 
the latter was established in 2010. The Policy Unit comprised the supportive staff of 
the old High Representative for CFSP. It consisted of thematic and regional desks. 
Additionally, the staff of the EU Situation Centre, which would be placed within the 
EEAS structure, was transferred to the EEAS.  
From the Commission, the entire DG for External Relations (Relex) was transferred 
to the EEAS. Just like the Policy Unit, DG Relex also contained thematic and regional 
desks. Moreover, the external service of the Commission (which headed all EU 
Delegation that existed) also fell under DG Relex. Apart from DG Relex, DG 
Development also transferred a number of staff members, in line with the split 
responsibilities of the EEAS and the Commission on development cooperation. 
However, former DG Relex and DG Development staff members who had financial 
and budgetary responsibilities would remain working for the Commission (Annex to 
the Council Decision L201). As we have seen in the previous section, it is likely that 
this separation of personnel will produce a rift in EU foreign policy decision-making 
and lead to inter-institutional turf wars.  
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Regarding the EEAS staff, a relevant question to address is whether a ‘European 
diplomatic community’ or an esprit de corps is emerging, for such a process could 
lead to vertical and horizontal coherence.  
First, a theoretical perspective on this question will be considered. Bátora (2011), who 
observes the EEAS from an Organisation-theoretical perspective, shows that 
socialisation between personnel at organisations may well lead to an ‘epistemic 
community’, with staff members constructing joint systems of meaning, of 
organisational identity and facilitating actorness. He comes to the conclusion that the 
demographically mixed set-up of the EEAS may well lead to, what we call here, a 
‘European diplomatic culture’: “Officials with professional experience both from 
member states’ foreign ministries and from EU-level external relations . . . represent 
important micro-level links connecting the fabric of the EU’s foreign policy making 
system” (Bátora, 2011, p. 8).  
Similarly, Balfour & Raik argue that close contacts between national diplomats of 
different member states and European officials may, lead to ‘elite socialisation’. This 
is a process that causes national diplomats to think from a European perspective 
because of their intensive cooperation within the European structures over an 
extended period.  
 
“Close diplomatic interaction through common institutions generates a habit of 
cooperation and makes an EU coordination reflex more likely. Intense contacts 
and regular coordination make it increasingly difficult to separate the national 
and European levels. Foreign policy cultures and identities become more similar 
and national and European interests converge” (Balfour & Raik, 2013, p. 3).  
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It is likely that the EEAS constitutes (or will soon constitute) such an institution in 
which national diplomats work closely together. Cherrier comes to a similar 
conclusion, when he mentions a “European diplomatic culture” (Cherrier, 2012, p. 
25). 
It may be concluded that the theoretical contributions that I consulted are quite 
positive about the capabilities of the EEAS staff to enhance coherence. At present, it 
is time to consider this from a practical perspective by turning to the experiences of 
the interview respondents. 
Most of the respondents indicated during the interviews that a ‘European diplomatic 
culture’ does not yet exist. Moreover, it also seems too optimistic to speak about an 
esprit de corps among the staff of the EEAS. A problem, in this respect, is that 
national seconded diplomats can only stay in the service of the EEAS for two terms of 
four years, not longer. This period is probably too short to build a veritable esprit de 
corps or to create links and networks similar to those of a national ministry of foreign 
affairs (interview with Koetsenruijter; interview with Pulch).  
Moreover, ideally an esprit de corps contains three key elements: stability, continuity 
and institutional memory. The EEAS itself is also still too young to comply with these 
requirements. Therefore, the creation of an esprit de corps is still very much a 
question of work in progress (interview with Pulch).  
According to Koetsenruijter, the fact that seconded national diplomats only remain 
with the service for a relatively short period of time is a flaw of the EEAS structure. 
“I think that it would be beneficial to found a European diplomatic academy. 
Accordingly, we can start building a common diplomatic culture. That would foster 
coherence” (interview with Koetsenruijter).6  
                                   
6 The author translated Mr. Koetsenruijter’s answer from Dutch to English. 
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The European Parliament also signalled this problem. During negotiations on the 
structure of the EEAS, the Parliament advised the negotiators to establish a provision 
that would enable seconded national diplomats to join the ranks of the EEAS as 
formal EU officials after the end of their terms as seconded diplomat (Mahncke, 
2012).  
Other interview respondents are less negative. They agree with the assertion that there 
is no esprit de corps. Yet, they emphasize that creating an esprit de corps requires a 
slow and lengthy process, and that this process has certainly started. Thence, they 
apply the term ‘emerging European diplomatic community’ to the present situation 
(interview with Tibbels; interview with Sohlstrom, Gerbrandij & Fernández-
Mazarambroz y de Arespochaga).  
Lastly, they also point to the fact that the professional culture of the EEAS is different 
from that at the former DG Relex, in that it constitutes a genuinely diplomatic culture. 
The reason for this is the participation of the member states diplomats, who have 
introduced a more diplomatic culture. This may foster vertical coherence, because 
communication between the national ministries of foreign affairs and the EEAS 
officials becomes easier.  
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2.4. Organisational aspects of the EEAS 
 
2.4.1. Organisational structure 
The EEAS consists of both thematic and regional desks, has a corporate section and 
an intelligence division. Moreover, it also contains a security operations desk and a 
crisis response room. Therefore, it is rather reminiscent of the organisation of a 
typical ministry of foreign affairs. “Initial empirical evidence suggests that the EU . . . 
seems ready to copy the organisational template . . . featuring geographical desks, 
functional desks and administrative support units common in the foreign ministries of 
modern states” (Bátora, 2011, p. 9). Moreover, seconded national diplomats also 
unconsciously expect the EEAS to develop in a species of EU foreign ministry. After 
all, they bring with them their standard practices and culture of state-diplomacy. 
Furthermore, the socialisation of seconded national diplomats and their counterparts 
from the Commission and the Council, makes that the EEAS staff as a whole starts 
sharing joint systems of meaning and of organisational identity (Bátora, 2011). 
Besides, through drafting up common policy documents and strategies the staff will 
start using the same ‘institutional language’.  
Thus, the EEAS has the structure of a genuine foreign ministry and is composed of 
staff that expects it to behave like such a ministry. These elements combined allow us 
to speak of a relatively large degree of unity of bureaucratic culture in the case of 
European foreign policy-making.  
At the time of birth of the EEAS, the organisation of the service seemed to constitute 
an efficient reorganisation of EU diplomacy, partly because of the moderate size of its 
bureaucracy (Cherrier, 2012). However, has the EEAS in practice been able to 
develop an orderly fashioned and well-functioning organisational structure? Some 
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serious problems are still identified by the interview respondents who work for the 
EEAS. 
First of all, according to three interview respondents, HRVP Catherine Ashton shows 
too little involvement with her employees at the EEAS.7 Apart from the fact that her 
function is too extensive to be enacted by one person and that she is a relatively low-
profile politician for the function of HRVP, another reason for doubting the aptitude 
of the current design of the HRVP’s function is that she deals almost exclusively with 
people of her own cabinet and keeps away from the EEAS staff (interview with a 
policy officer of the EEAS). Additionally, there are also complaints from the member 
states about her availability at debates with national parliaments (interview with a 
diplomat at the permanent representation of the Netherlands to the EU). 
Second, the position of the HRVP’s cabinet also poses challenges to the efficiency of 
the EEAS. The cabinet forms an additional level of coordination unknown to most 
national foreign ministries. The main problem is that the cabinet needs to approve all 
policy documents created by the desks of the EEAS. While the thematic and regional 
desks are narrowly specialised, the cabinet therefore has a very wide orientation. In 
spite of this, the cabinet wishes to micro-manage on all issues, which causes their 
process of approval to be very lengthy. This poses real problems when, for example, 
the EEAS is called upon by the Council of Ministers to present a proposal for the 
imposition of sanctions to a certain country. As decisions to impose sanctions are very 
momentous and politically sensitive, they need to be enacted swiftly. However, when 
the document reaches the desk of Ashton’s cabinet, it may lay there for several days, 
is the experience of an interview respondent. The member states do not have the time 
to wait this long. In such situations, it is mostly one of the larger member states that 
                                   
7 On this issue, the respondents prefer to remain anonymous. 
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submits a draft proposal to the Council instead of the EEAS. That is a big loss for the 
EEAS’ agent autonomy (interview with a policy officer of the EEAS). 
Third, the EEAS lacks sufficient resources to perform its coordinating role to its full 
potential. During the establishment of the EEAS, it was agreed that the service would 
be set-up with respect to the principle of budget-neutrality (Reynaert, 2011).  
In general, many interview respondents agreed that there are still problems of an 
organisational nature within the EEAS. These problems originate most frequently 
when budgets are concerned. As the EEAS is not fully responsible for its own budget, 
it has to rely on diverse and complex budget procedures of the Council and the 
Commission. Also on non-budgetary matters, there are too many guidelines of 
different institutions and bureaucratic layers that EEAS officials have to deal with 
(interview with Pulch).  
 
2.4.2. Institutionalisation 
“In the context of EU foreign policy making, one of the key issues is the 
development and institutionalisation of the EEAS both in terms of its 
embeddedness in the diplomatic system and in terms of its embeddedness in the 
system of multi-level governance in the EU” (Bátora, 2011, p. 9). 
 
The text cited above refers to the independent variable ‘institutionalisation’. This 
concept refers to the degree to which the EEAS has acquired meanings and goals 
beyond its immediate function, both for the international community and for the 
EEAS employees and European citizens.  
The process of institutionalisation is usually lengthy (Bátora, 2011). As the EEAS is 
still a young service, we may expect to find that the institutionalisation is still under 
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way or has only just started to develop itself. An illustrative example of this was 
provided by Koetsenruijter: “Since a long time, the European institutions organise an 
annual football tournament. There are teams with officials from the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council. However, when I wanted to join an EEAS 
team, I found out that there is not yet an EEAS team. The EEAS was not able yet to 
form a proper team of its own.” (interview with Koetsenruijter). This illustrates very 
well how the EU community in Brussels is not yet accustomed to the EEAS. The 
latter still has to earn a right of existence for itself in Brussels.  
In this respect, a very significant symbol has been the building of the EEAS. When 
the EEAS set sail in 2010, the service did not dispose of a proper building yet. The 
opening of the new building was a real moment of glory for the EEAS. “It felt like 
becoming a true institution” (Interview with Sohlstrom, Gerbrandij & Fernández-
Mazarambroz y de Arespochaga). The building is located on the Shuman Square, 
where also the buildings of the Council and the Commission are located. The sense, in 
other words, that the EEAS deserves a spot of its own in the centre of the power in 
Brussels, has been very important in creating a sense of a certain commonness 
amongst the EEAS personnel.  
This is in line with the theory of organisational locus: “The tough turf-battles between 
the Commission and the Council as to where the EEAS should have its official seat 
and the fact that it ended up in a separate building approximately equidistant from the 
two institutions, indicate the continued importance of physical location for wielding 
influence on policy making” (Bátora, 2011, p. 7).  
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3. The Principals 
 
3.1. Establishing the EEAS: hard bargaining 
With regard to the establishment of the EEAS, article 27.3 TEU states:  
 
“The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 
shall be established by a decision of he Council. The Council shall act on a 
proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament 
and after obtaining the consent of the Commission” (Article 27.3, TEU). 
 
The process described above formed the framework for the intensive bargaining that 
took place in the first half year of 2010. The principal stakeholders were the HRVP, 
the EU member states (through their obvious involvement in the Council), the 
European Commission, the Council Secretariat and the European Parliament.  
During the set-up process of the EEAS, it became clear that the negotiating actors all 
had large interests at stake in the process.  
Although an important goal of the decision to include the EEAS in the Treaty of 
Lisbon had been the concern over European foreign policy coherence, the 
Commission and the member states seemed only interested in protecting and 
increasing their power instead of enhancing coherence (Reynaert, 2012). A journalist 
even typified the negotiation process thus: “The European Commission and the EU 
member states are in the middle of a nasty scrap over who is to have the most 
influence on Europe’s new diplomatic corps” (Phillips, 2010). But what caused this 
antagonistic bargaining? It is possible to identify a number of causes.  
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First of all, the establishment of a European foreign service was a constituent issue for 
the member states and other actors. Running a foreign policy is one of the primary 
characteristics of a sovereign state and therefore any modification to that right 
constitutes a domain of ‘high politics’. In high politics domains, where the interests at 
stake are very important for the stakeholders, actors are likely to deploy a ‘realist’ 
attitude to the negotiation process. (Reynaert, 2012).  
Second, apart from being a constituent issue for the actors, EU foreign policy was an 
issue on which the European Commission and the member states already enjoyed 
large responsibilities. It may be expected, therefore, that giving up part of these 
powers might even be more difficult than negotiating over an entirely new policy 
domain.  
Third, the rules of the bargaining process on the EEAS, as designed by article 27.3 
TEU, did not facilitate the process either. Not only did it oblige the Council to obtain 
the approval of the European Commission but it also had to consult the European 
Parliament, which wielded power over the budget of the EEAS. More important still, 
the Council also had to take the decision by unanimity. Consequently, all actors at the 
table practically had a veto at their disposition. Therefore, the bargaining process 
followed a “non-coercive system of unanimous voting” (Reynaert, 2012, p. 216).  
Fourth, the position of the HRVP during the bargaining process was relatively weak 
in comparison to that of the other negotiators. As Catherine Ashton only learned in 
December 2009 that she would be appointed as HRVP, after which the negotiations 
would commence immediately, she had far less time to prepare herself than the 
European institutions and member states. The latter were aware of the upcoming 
EEAS negotiations since 2007, as the Treaty of Lisbon had announced the foundation 
of this organisation.  
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Furthermore, the Commission and the member states had the same access to 
information as the HRVP during the process, because Catherine Ashton had invited 
them to join the working group on the EEAS, which was composed to provide advises 
on the proposal for the establishment of the service (Reynaert, 2012).  
All these elements caused the negotiation process to be characterised by ‘hard 
bargaining’. The result of this hard bargaining was, as was stipulated in the previous 
chapter of this thesis, a rather restrictive and precise mandate for the EEAS.  
Nevertheless, the results of the negotiation process were not exclusively negative for 
the EEAS. After all, the regional and thematic desks that work with CFSP matters and 
communitarian policies are located within the EEAS and not within the Commission 
(Duke, 2009).  As a coordination mechanism, therefore, the EEAS may still function 
very well.  
Moreover, compared to the former DG Relex of the Commission the EEAS occupies 
a more optimal place within the EU institutional architecture. Through contacts with 
the other institutions the EEAS may be able to gradually enlarge its functions in an 
informal way. In sum, the outcome of the bargaining process turned the EEAS into an 
organisation “that is less optimal in its function but more politically feasible” (Barton, 
2012, p. 76).  
 
3.1.1. Member states versus the European Commission 
The actors at the table during the negotiations on the establishment of the EEAS did 
not form a uniform front with the goal of limiting the power of the EEAS. In this 
respect, it may be useful to concisely shed light on the rivalry between the member 
states and the Commission.  
 62 
When considering the reasons for the establishment of the EEAS from a PA 
perspective and looking further than the quest for more coherence in the EU’s foreign 
policies, it can be concluded that founding the EEAS was an act partly inspired 
precisely to limit agency slippage; namely, that of the European Commission.  
For, although the member states aimed to pool their resources and create a more 
coherent European foreign policy, they did not want to further empower the 
Commission by extending the scope of DG Relex. The Commission has a well-
established reputation for “pushing the boundaries of its mandate” and can dispose of 
a large spectre of resources. Thus, the Commission already showed a large degree of 
agency slippage and was not easily kept under control by the member states anymore. 
Therefore, it made sense to remove DG Relex from the institutional structure of the 
Commission and to confer it to a new service (Furness, 2011).  
After all, it was the goal of the member states to preserve the intergovernmental 
nature of decision-making on CFSP and ESDP matters. Observing the negotiation 
process on the EEAS from this perspective shows us that there is considerable 
heterogeneity of interest among the principals of the EEAS. 
 
3.1.2. Ex ante controls 
First and foremost, the most convincing ex ante control applied to the EEAS is its 
limited mandate. As has been stipulated in previous sections of this thesis, the EEAS’ 
scope was considerably constrained because of the principals’ fear of losing 
influence. Even before the negotiation process started, the Commission had succeeded 
in safeguarding a number of policy areas for itself, such as trade, development and 
neighbourhood policy.  
 63 
Secondly, the Council’s appointment of the first HRVP, Catherine Ashton, was in 
itself a form of ex ante control. The reason for this is that Ashton was a relatively 
low-profile politician to take up the very symbolic and powerful function of HRVP. 
Hence, her potential to engage in agency slippage by increasing the EEAS’ 
international standing, which would lead to institutionalisation of the EEAS, was not 
great (Mahnke, 2012).  
A third ex ante control concerns the deputies of the HRVP. Whereas the European 
Parliament advocated a number of politically accountable deputies to be put in place, 
the member states succeeded in retaining this role for their ministers of foreign 
affairs. As such, only they, together with the Commissioners who are concerned with 
external relations policies, have the right to deputize for the HRVP (Reynaert, 2012).  
 
3.1.3. Ex post controls 
The EEAS is under continuous ‘ex post control surveillance’. In first instance, this is 
done by the seconded national diplomats who are working for the EEAS. As these 
officials temporarily become a part of the organisational structure of the EEAS itself, 
they may very swiftly report processes of agency slippage to their home governments.  
In the second place, the European Parliament keeps an oversight of European foreign 
policy. However, it is the question to which extent it can exercise a solid day-to-day 
monitoring function on foreign policy issues. The reason for this is that plenary 
session debates with HRVP Ashton have little chances of becoming reciprocal. MEP 
Van Baalen:  
 
“It is not possible to have a substantial debate with Catherine Ashton in 
parliament. This says more about the institutional design of the European 
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Parliament than about Ashton. Apart from the ‘blue card procedure’, which is of 
limited value, interrupting in the debate is not really possible” (interview with 
Van Baalen).8 
 
A third form of ex post control is oversight by the Council of Ministers, enacted 
through the committees and working groups that are comprised of member states’ 
diplomats. 
Lastly, the member states always dispose of the threat of affecting the EEAS’ 
mandate by Council Decisions (Furness, 2011). That measure also constitutes an 
important ex post control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
8 The author translated Mr. Van Baalen’s statement from Dutch to English.  
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3.2. The principals of the EEAS 
 
3.2.1. The Member states 
Recalling the PA relationships that were defined in chapter 1, the member states 
constitute the most powerful principals of the EEAS. They do not only delegate 
power to the EEAS via the Council, but they also delegate power to the European 
Commission, which is itself a principal of the EEAS. Therefore, a positive stance 
from the member states towards the EEAS means almost everything to the fate of the 
latter.  
Member states’ governments are political actors as opposed to the European 
Commission and the EEAS, which are mainly bureaucratic actors. Therefore, the 
main variable determining the member states’ delegation of power to the EEAS is 
their political will (interview with Van Baalen; interview with Sohlstrom, Gerbrandij 
& Fernández-Mazambroz y de Arespochaga).  
Clearly, there has been some political will to establish the EEAS, because otherwise 
the institution would not be functioning today. However, the reasons behind the 
decision to establish the EEAS have to do with more than enhancing European 
foreign policy coherence. As we have seen, they also have to do with limiting the 
powers of the Commission: an example of ‘agent shopping’.  
In general, the member states lack the political will to transfer comprehensive foreign 
policy-making powers to the European institutions. This was also visible during the 
negotiations on the EEAS. “Overall, the member states were simply reluctant to give 
the new service authority at the expense of their national prerogatives” (Mahncke, 
2012, p. 36).  
 66 
There are two reasons for this refusal. The first relates to the reflex of ‘bureaucratic 
self-survival’ of national foreign services (Balfour & Raik, 2013). The second reason 
is much more fundamental: it is the natural tendency of national states to protect their 
sovereignty.  
Nevertheless, the member states’ preferences towards the EEAS are far from uniform.  
A first division between the member states is that between the large and small 
member states. This division is of a purely functional nature: The smaller member 
states have less resources to conduct certain areas of foreign policy themselves and 
therefore it is relatively more beneficial for them to pool resources with other member 
states (interview with a policy officer of the EEAS). An example of an area where 
smaller member states favour more EEAS coordination is consular affairs (Comelli & 
Matarazzo, 2011). Additionally, smaller member states promote a stronger role of the 
EU Delegations in e.g. reporting (Balfour & Raik, 2013).  
In spite of this, the smaller member states do complain that they have less access to 
information from the EEAS than the larger member states. In line with this, diplomats 
of the larger member states report to have more intensive contacts with the EEAS 
(Balfour & Raik, 2013).  
A different level of analysis is the overall stance towards foreign policy integration. 
Here, two camps between the member states emerge. Germany, Italy, Sweden, 
Poland, Finland, Portugal, Estonia and Greece seem to occupy the most positive 
stance towards foreign policy integration. On the other side, the UK, France and the 
Czech Republic, among others, are more sceptical (Balfour & Raik, 2013).  
Although two camps can be identified, it must be emphasized that each country does 
have a specific stance on the EEAS, so variations in attitude between the members of 
the same ‘camp’ definitely occurs.  
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The above once again underlines that the interest heterogeneity between the different 
principals of the EEAS runs high.  
 
3.2.2. The European Commission 
Currently, there is still institutional wariness from the side of the Commission towards 
the EEAS. Defending the role of the EEAS versus that of the Commission is therefore 
a constant battle (interview with a policy officer of the EEAS).  
The European Commission has shown more than once that it sees the division of 
competences between the EEAS and itself as a zero-sum game. This was especially 
visible during, and shortly after, the negotiation process on the EEAS.  
Perhaps the most confronting bargaining move came from Commission President 
Barroso in 2009, before the negotiation process started. Since 2008 the Commission 
and the member states had been anticipating the establishment of the EEAS, by 
making it clear that certain competences, like trade and enlargement, would remain 
with the Commission. By then, however, it was clear that the relevant services of DG 
Relex would be transferred to the future EEAS (Council Progress Report 10650/08). 
Neighbourhood Policy was one of these services. However, when the Commission 
was re-established in 2009, Barroso decided to move Neighbourhood Policy from DG 
Relex to a new DG for enlargement and neighbourhood policy. Accordingly, Barroso 
prevented the transfer of competences on neighbourhood policy from the Commission 
to the EEAS.  
In fact, the Commission emerged from the negotiations on the EEAS with more 
competences than before (!). The Commission gained competences in the sphere of 
humanitarian aid and pre-accession financial assistance (Reynaert, 2012).  
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One should be cautious, however, not to create a too negative image of the 
Commission’s stance towards the EEAS. It should not be forgotten that the 
Commission and the EEAS have been cooperating on foreign policy issues for more 
than two and a half years now. Although some of the interview respondents have 
noted that there are still some inter-institutional inconveniences, mainly concerning 
the traditionally communautarian policy areas, they also maintain that inter-
institutional cooperation in general happens with collegiality and in a friendly 
manner.  
An interview respondent who works for the Commission stated that the Commission 
services are working with the EEAS regional desks as if those desks were still in DG 
Relex and that the coordination is good over all (interview with Peresso).  
 
3.2.3. European Parliament 
During the bargaining process, the European Parliament defended the position that 
would grant the EEAS most competence and would therefore most enhance coherence 
of European foreign policy. The reason for this is, undoubtedly, that the European 
Parliament had least foreign policy powers to loose (Reynaert, 2012).  
As the European Parliament does not delegate authority to the EEAS, it cannot be 
considered a principal. Nevertheless, it does exercise influence over the EEAS. It does 
so by using two instruments. First, the European Parliament holds regular hearings 
with Commissioners. Second, the parliament exercises budgetary control over the 
EEAS (Furness, 2011).  
As the HRVP is well aware of these indirect powers of the EEAS, she attempts to 
accommodate the position of the European Parliament as much as she can. MEP Van 
Baalen: 
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“Ashton does not want to jeopardize her good relationship with the European 
Parliament. For that reason, she usually pays respect to its resolutions as much 
as she can. Even if there would be unanimity in the Council on certain difficult 
issues, the HRVP would not fully disregard the Parliament, and send it a formal 
letter stating that its concerns will be respected as much as possible” (interview 
with Van Baalen).9 
 
Be that as it may, the relations between the EEAS and the European Parliament are of 
an informal nature. On substantive issues, the EEAS is under no obligation to inform 
the European Parliament. Moreover, even the budgetary powers of the Parliament are 
sometimes put into perspective: “. . . the extent to which this right gives 
Parliamentarians policy leverage is unclear, as refusing approval for the EEAS’ 
budget would be a ‘nuclear option’ that would shut down the service completely and 
is unlikely to be contemplated even in the most serious of crises” (Furness, 2011, p. 
19).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
9 The author translated Mr. Van Baalen’s answer from Dutch to English.  
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4. Vertical coherence  
When examining the effect of the EEAS on vertical coherence, the key question to 
answer is: Has convergence occurred between the foreign policies of the member 
states of the European Union? The present chapter will attempt to answer this 
question. More specifically, the chapter will start by identifying some practices that 
are applied in current EEAS policy-making. After that, it will consider whether 
information asymmetry, EEAS personnel, the delegations and/or the agenda setting 
potential of the EEAS and the HRVP have had influence on vertical coherence. It will 
do so mainly by drawing on the information that was acquired during interviews with 
officials of the European institutions.  
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4.1. Practices that enhance vertical coherence 
In order to give a good assessment of the practices of the EEAS in this respect, it is 
necessary to be aware of the decision-making structure in foreign policy-making at 
EU level, with a special focus on CFSP/ESDP matters.  
The policy process starts at the European Council, which sets out the general 
guidelines and principles with regard to European foreign policy. The eventual 
adoption of the policy is done by the Council of Ministers (the Foreign Affairs 
Council), which also monitors its implementation (Reynaert, 213).  
However, before the Council takes decisions, a considerable amount of preparatory 
work is executed at different levels. The HRVP has the duty to initiate policy 
proposals (Art. 18.2 TEU), to which assistance is given by the EEAS. These policy 
proposals are then considered by the member states’ Permanent Representations in the 
many Council preparatory bodies (Committees and working groups) that negotiate 
proposals on CFSP/ESDP matters. Finally, when the Council preparatory bodies have 
negotiated a final version, the proposal is send to the Foreign Affairs Council, where 
it is adopted or refused.   
One of the most significant changes that the establishment of the EEAS has entailed is 
that the preparatory bodies mentioned above are now chaired by EEAS officials (Art. 
4.4.,Council Decision L201).  This modification of the preparation structure has had 
some significant implications.   
Firstly, it placed the EEAS in a convenient situation to lead the coordination process 
between the member states. Before the EEAS was established, representatives of the 
rotating Presidency of the Council chaired these committees and working groups of 
the Foreign Affairs Council. Frequently, these chairpersons had more interest in 
advertising their own states’ preferences than in coordinating the member state 
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positions in order to create a coherent policy (interview with Koetsenruijter; interview 
with, Gebrandrij & Fernández-Mazarambroz y de Arespacochaga). Therefore, an 
independent EEAS chair is in a better position to serve as a ‘mediator’ between the 
member states.  
Secondly, through its role as the chair of the working groups, the EEAS can play the 
role of an agenda setter. The choice of the issues on the agenda is now motivated by 
the topicality of these issues and by the goal to create a coherent foreign policy. In the 
pre-EEAS era, the rotating presidency often scheduled issues that were of sole 
importance for the current president’s own member state, but of little relevance for 
the other representatives present.  
Apart from deviating the debate from important foreign policy matters to issues that 
may not be of relevance to the majority of the member states, this practice also had its 
effects on the presence of member states during the working groups: They were often 
poorly attended. This changed significantly when the EEAS came into being. 
Especially the coordination meetings with member states at the Delegations were 
much better attended after the establishment of the EEAS (interview with 
Koetsenruijter).  
Thirdly, EEAS chairpersons of working groups are in a good position to keep account 
of developments in other foreign policy areas that could generate effects for the topics 
on the table.  
Finally, a very important advantage of the EEAS chairmanship of Council preparatory 
bodies is the fact that it improves the continuity in the working groups and 
committees. In the old situation it was difficult to achieve continuity as a result of the 
six months-term of the rotating Presidency (interview with a diplomat at the 
permanent representation of the Netherlands to the EU). 
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However, the advantages of the EEAS chairmanship should be balanced by a number 
of more critical considerations. In first instance, the six months-term of the rotating 
presidency may have had negative consequences for continuity, but it did ensure the 
presence of pressure on the side of the Presidency to ‘push’ certain issues through the 
decision-making bodies before the end of its term. Yet, the rather short time-span of 
the chairmanship did provide for a brisker pace in the Council structures. That 
proactivity lacks in the current situation (interview with a diplomat at the permanent 
representation of the Netherlands to the EU).  
What is more, the presence of the EEAS at the coordinating meetings sometimes 
complicates the picture. According to a diplomat at the permanent representation of 
the Netherlands to the EU, the EEAS has already developed its own agenda on certain 
foreign policy areas. When seeking to promote this agenda, the EEAS resembles a 
‘29th’ member state at the table, rather than an independent chairman (interview with 
a diplomat at the permanent representation of the Netherlands to the EU). In such a 
situation, the extended length of the negotiations tends to offset the profits of EEAS 
chairmanship.  
A third observation is that the performance of the EEAS chair of the working groups 
is very dependent on the person who actually executes the job. Personality of a 
chairperson is a variable that plays a significant role in relation to the outcome of 
negotiations. Therefore, while prescribing the positive or negative effects of 
chairmanship to the new situation, one would have to account for a small margin of 
error created by the capabilities of independent officials (interview with a diplomat at 
the permanent representation of the Netherlands to the EU).  
Lastly, EEAS representatives only chair Council preparatory bodies that fall under the 
scope of the Foreign Affairs Council. However, issues at stake in other Council 
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formations, such as development cooperation or trade, also have important 
implications for EU external relations. Although these former first pillar policies do 
fall under the competences of the EEAS – albeit in cooperation with the Commission 
– the EEAS does not chair the relevant Council preparatory bodies. On such issues, it 
is COREPER rather than the EEAS, which disposes of the umbrella view of all 
policies with external implications that pass the Council of Ministers. The question 
remains: which is better equipped to set the agenda on matters like these, the member 
state holding the Presidency or the EEAS (Galeazzi, 2013)?10 The relative importance 
of chairing working groups and committees is displayed by the EEAS’ wish to chair 
the Committee on Development (CODEV). As Galeazzi (2013) puts it: “The EEAS is 
likely to want to chair CODEV since for both political and administrative reasons it 
could well believe in the longer-run it would make life easier for the service in 
preparing the Foreign Affairs Council that deals with development.”  
The same advantages and disadvantages as referred to above may be expected from 
the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Council by the HRVP instead of the rotating 
Presidency, although here the effects may be more far-reaching. It has been noted that 
the Foreign Affairs Council follows a stricter regime than before the establishment of 
the HRVP and EEAS (interview with Pulch). The HRVP stands at the apex of a 
‘policy preparation factory’ created by the EEAS. Therefore, various ‘rounds’ of 
EEAS coordination have been able to guide a certain issue until it ends up in the 
Foreign Affairs Council, where the HRVP can finish the pyramid of member state 
guidance facilitated by the EEAS. 
Another EEAS activity that has enhanced vertical coherence when compared to the 
old situation is the practice of ‘joint programming’. Joint programming is a process by 
                                   
10 It must be noted, however, that the EEAS is involved in shaping these policies in an earlier stage of 
the policy-making process, namely during formal and informal inter-service meetings with the 
Commission. For more information on this issue, see the chapter on horizontal coherence.  
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which development cooperation is coordinated between the member states and the 
EU. As development cooperation is a former first pillar policy that still partly falls 
under the competence of the Commission, the latter also joins in the joint 
programming process.  
Basically, joint programming involves three main activities: sharing analysis, 
developing a common strategic view and allocating a budget (interview with 
Sohlstrom, Gebrandrij & Fernández-Mazarambroz y de Arespacochaga). The aim of 
the joint programming process is to get the development policies of the 28 member 
states in line with the EU development policy, which is made jointly by the 
Commission and the EEAS. It does so by drafting joint country strategy documents, 
which should replace bilateral country strategies of the member states. These strategy 
documents also include a provision on the division of labour between the different 
member states involved. Joint programming has already led to some successes, like 
the application of the joint strategy document by member states in their development 
cooperation with Ethiopia (Galeazzi, Helly & Krätke, 2013). 
It should be mentioned that the major part of joint programming takes place in the 
partner countries, at the EU Delegations. The Delegations play a large role in 
coordinating and programming together with the embassies of the member states that 
join in the development cooperation process (interview with Sohlstrom, Gebrandrij & 
Fernández-Mazarambroz y de Arespacochaga). 
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4.2. Information asymmetry  
Nearly all respondents who were interviewed during the preparations for this thesis 
agreed that the flow of information to the EU external relations decision-making 
system has increased considerably in comparison with the situation before the EEAS 
was established. They maintain that there is an information asymmetry between the 
EEAS and the member states. There are several reasons for the emergence of this 
asymmetry.  
Firstly, the EEAS gathers information through its role as the chair of the Council 
preparatory bodies, where EEAS chairpersons have the platform to engage in 
informal talks with member state representatives while attempting to fulfil a 
mediating role during negotiations on a certain topic.  
Secondly, the EU Delegations form a useful source of information, as they convene 
monthly meetings between representatives of all EU member states to discuss the 
situation in the host country. The outcomes of these meetings are written down in 
Head of Missions Reports (HOMS Reports), which are send to Brussels in order to 
inform the EEAS about the member states positions (Bicchi, 2012).  
During HOMS meetings, the member states voice their positions on political 
developments in a very early stage. This does not only improve the information 
supply for the EEAS, but also for the member states reciprocally. The information 
shared through this medium is very useful in shaping vertically coherent policies, as 
“you can still do most with information about each other’s position in the earlier 
stages of policy-making” (interview with an official of the ministry of foreign affairs 
of the Netherlands).  
However, the HOMS reports are not the only reports that originate at the Delegations. 
Increasingly, EU Delegations also engage in political reporting. A political report 
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differs from a HOMS report in that it is not a negotiated document in which all the 
positions of the member states are displayed, but a short “snapshot with advice of EU 
Delegation staff on action to be taken by the EEAS” (Bicchi, 2012, p. 90).  
Thirdly, the fact that seconded national diplomats of the member states form one-third 
of the staff of the EEAS provides for a steady supply of information on an informal 
basis about member states’ positions and decision-making procedures. The seconded 
national diplomats at the headquarters of the EEAS keep each other informed about, 
for example, when certain issues are treated by the parliaments of their member states. 
Accordingly, EEAS officials know better when to inform member states about a 
certain topic and what the preferences of a member state are (interview with a policy 
officer of the EEAS).  
Fourthly, on a much more specific level the EEAS has also been able to draw 
information in its own direction: the service seems to have taken the lead in the 
distribution of COREU (CORrespondence EUropéene) messages.  
The COREU system is a communication system intended to send and receive 
confidential diplomatic information to the key actors in European foreign policy: the 
member states, the Council Secretariat, the Commission and, since 2011, the EEAS. 
The system is much akin to communication systems of national ministries of foreign 
affairs. “From a technical point of view, the network can be equated to a sophisticated 
telex system via encrypted transmission” (Bicchi, 2012, p. 83). A study by Bicchi 
(2012) has showed that the EEAS sends by far the largest number of COREUs when 
compared to other EU institutions.  
Finally, the EEAS has also increased the information flow between member states, 
EU actors and third country governments on consular affairs. It does so by facilitating 
a protected website on the internet where member states and other actors can 
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exchange sensitive information that may be valuable for consular cooperation, such as 
data of citizens located in certain areas or maps. This forum is called CoOL (Consular 
Online) (Bicchi, 2012). The development of CoOL, which is done by the EEAS 
Situation Center (SITCEN), is remarkable because cooperation on consular matters is 
still a very sensitive issue for some member states.  
It may be concluded that the EEAS has succeeded in creating information asymmetry 
between itself and the member states. It has been able to do so by exploiting the 
unique location it occupies in the institutional architecture of European foreign policy 
making: standing between the member states and the Community, and drawing upon 
the competences that the HRVP received from the Treaty of Lisbon.  
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4.3. Agenda setting role 
Apart from the positive aspects of information asymmetry, the EEAS also enjoys the 
role of agenda setter on CFSP matters, with which vertical coherence can be 
enhanced. We have already concisely touched upon the agenda setting potential of the 
EEAS when drawing up policy briefs and when performing the chair’s function in the 
Council preparatory bodies. However, the most important agenda setting role 
deserves a mention of its own: in a strict sense, it is not the EEAS but the HRVP who 
enjoys this role of agenda setter as she is the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council.11 
“The HRVP’s role as the head of the foreign affairs council is the main means with 
which the coherence between the member states and the EU is enhanced” (interview 
with Tibbels). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
11 As was stated in chapter 2, we will consider the EEAS and the HRVP two sides of the same puzzle 
for the purposes of the present research. The HRVP is entitled to make decisions; the EEAS is the 
supporting bureaucracy.   
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4.4. EEAS Personnel 
It could be argued that the EEAS harbours a vertical coherence enhancement 
instrument in its very own organisational structure: its staff. As at least one third of 
the EEAS officials should consist of seconded diplomats from the ministries of 
foreign affairs of the member states, much communication takes place between 
member states diplomats at the EEAS headquarters. These diplomats bring along best 
practices and knowledge from their different foreign services. It could therefore be 
argued that while doing shaping EU foreign policy together, they are collectively 
aware of the demands and principles of the different member states foreign policies. It 
is my hypothesis that they can thus progressively form a ‘European diplomatic 
culture’ with an esprit de corps at the EEAS. This could enhance vertical coherence in 
European foreign policy.  
The professional networks that the seconded national diplomats bring with them are 
being identified as the main mechanism through which EEAS personnel themselves 
contribute to vertical coherence (interview with Houttuin; interview with Sohlstrom, 
Gebrandrij & Fernández-Mazarambroz y de Arespacochaga; interview with Pulch). 
These networks enable the seconded national diplomats to quickly acquire feedback 
from national governments on certain issues.  
Additionally, the easier communication between the EEAS and the member states 
inures to the benefit of both sides. Not only EEAS officials learn from their home 
ministries, but national representatives will also gain information about the process in 
Brussels more easily via their networks. A policy officer of the Dutch ministry of 
foreign affairs stated that there is frequent communication with Dutch EEAS officials 
about the functioning of the EEAS. Sometimes, these contacts have a policy 
substantial character. In such situations, the EEAS diplomats may tell their Dutch 
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colleagues that the Netherlands should change its position on a certain issue on which 
the Netherlands does not have a high interest. However, slightly changing the position 
might ease the European decision-making process considerably (interview with an 
official of the ministry of foreign affairs of the Netherlands).   
These findings concerning the staff of the EEAS all confirm my hypothesis that a 
more diverse provenance of the EEAS personnel will lead to more vertical coherence. 
However, the answer to the hypothesis is far from only positive. As was noted in 
chapter 2, it would be incorrect to speak of an esprit de corps or ‘European diplomatic 
community’ in relation to the EEAS. According to the interview respondents, 
diplomats stay in service of the EEAS too shortly in order for a veritable esprit de 
corps to be created. Obviously, it is too soon to judge the organisation on its capacity 
to build such an esprit de corps as it is only two and a half years old. Therefore, time 
will learn whether a ‘European diplomatic community’ will be a reality once.  
At present, however, we may say that the hypothesis is neither to be rejected, nor to 
be fully affirmed. Nonetheless, it is certain that the different nature of the personnel of 
the EEAS has had some positive effects, mainly concerning the networks that officials 
bring with them to Brussels.  
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4.5. Delegations  
The EEAS heads a network of 141 EU Delegations that are located in third countries 
or at international organizations. These Delegations are the very raison d’etre of the 
EEAS: they are what make the EEAS a foreign service.  
There are several ways in which the EU Delegations contribute to achieving vertical 
coherence in European foreign policy making. A number of those we have already 
considered: the Delegations are a key instrument of information gathering for the 
EEAS through HOMS reports and political reporting. As such, the information can be 
used to better coordinate negotiations between member states on a certain issue, as a 
result of which a common position may be easier to reach.  
Second, the Delegations play an important role in the process of joint programming of 
development cooperation. They do so by formulating divisions of labour between the 
member states and advising the EEAS headquarters on financial allocations.  
On these areas, a precondition for the well functioning of the EU Delegations is the 
degree to which member states are prepared to accept their presence and activities. 
According to Balfour and Raik (2013), the member states generally see the 
Delegations in a positive light. They have even called for a more political approach of 
the Delegations. Moreover, EU member states are eager users of the political 
reporting system of the EU Delegations, which they would want to enhance (Balfour 
& Raik, 2013). This shows that the benefits of EU Delegations are broadly being 
acknowledged by the member states, which in turn gives the EU Delegation more 
leeway to expand their work.  
It is not very surprising that the member states occupy a positive disposition towards 
the EU Delegations, for it is this network of EEAS postings that can in the long run 
produce considerable cuts in public expenditure for them. There are two main ways 
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through which these financial benefits could be attained: First, through co-location of 
embassies with EU Delegations, and second, through cooperating with EU 
Delegations on consular affairs. According to the comprehensive study of Balfour and 
Raik, “many member states have started to show an interest in the possibility of co-
locating embassies with EU delegation, which saves practical costs and facilitates 
coordinated action” (Balfour & Raik, 2013, p. 8).  
The current economic crisis may provide another incentive for the member states to 
cooperate with the EU Delegations on matters like these. Because of the economic 
crisis that struck Europe, the European governments need to cut their budgets more 
than ever. When one combines this fact with the establishment of the EEAS in exactly 
the same time frame, “it can be rationally expected that representations of Member 
States will shrink in seize, at least where stakes are low.  . . . This in turn will benefit 
the European service, as Member States will increasingly depend on its network” 
(Cherrier, 2012, pp. 25-26).  
Indeed, the government of the Netherlands is at present actively seeking for 
possibilities of co-locating diplomatic facilities with the EEAS. However, it seems 
that there are still no realistic possibilities to engage in this process immediately. 
Before putting more effort in this possibility, the member states need to define which 
activities can be executed by the EU Delegations and which activities will remain 
under the exclusive competence of the member states representations (interview with 
an official of the ministry of foreign affairs of the Netherlands).  
The fact that member states are actively engaged in exploring the possibilities of more 
intensive cooperation with the EU Delegations shows that the EU Delegations 
harbour an even larger potential to create vertical coherence. Cooperation with 
member states on consular affairs would increase vertical coherence on a procedural 
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level: it would entail the establishment of similar consular practice for the 
participating member states. Moreover, co-location with national embassies would 
foster vertical coherence through increased contacts and a diminution of task 
duplication.  
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4.6. Policy Convergence between member states? 
Thus far, this section has identified practices and structures of the EEAS and the 
European foreign policy-making system that could be instrumental in improving 
vertical coherence. But is there evidence of actual policy convergence between the 
member states? 
It is only possible to supply responses to this question with a mixed answer. The 
mixed answer comprises two dimensions: strategies and actions.  
Concerning convergence in strategies, it must be said that there are still few common 
European strategies towards regions of the world. Many interview respondents of my 
research have identified the formation of common strategies as the most important 
area in which the EEAS can considerably augment its role (interview with Houttuin; 
interview with Koetsenruijter; interview with Sohlstrom, Gebrandrij & Fernández-
Mazarambroz y de Arespacochaga).  
The HRVP has not yet been able to formulate European strategies on relations with 
the strategic partners, which are, however, of great importance for Europe. The only 
comprehensive EU strategy to date has been the memo on the Arab Spring of 2011 
(interview with Koetsenruijter).  
Although comprehensive and politically important common European strategies may 
largely be lacking, there was still enough room for the EEAS to promote vertical 
coherence in the positions of member states towards Russia. “The member states now 
have a more narrow bandwidth towards Russia. Before, a gap between some EU 
member states existed, for example on the issue of energy deliveries from Russia to 
Germany. That gap is now not totally gone, but it has narrowed considerably” 
(interview with Pulch).  
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With regard to actions of the member states, a few recent examples of negative 
vertical coherence quite easily come to mind. The most recent example is the end of 
the EU arms embargo on the Syrian opposition in May of this year. The arms 
embargo, although well supported by the majority of the member states, was 
abandoned because two member states wanted to be able to supply arms in the event 
of a civil war (interview with a policy officer of the EEAS). This example shows 
clearly how national considerations can break down a common stance.  
Another example of an action of negative vertical coherence is last November’s vote 
in the UNGA on the upgrade of Palestine’s status in the United Nations. The status of 
Palestine was eventually upgraded to a ‘non-member observer status’, but the EU did 
not display a single voice: fifteen member states voted in favour of the status upgrade, 
eleven abstained from voting and one (the Czech Republic) voted against (Morselli, 
2013). Similarly, this example shows that the EU member states still act divided on 
certain foreign policy issues.  
When classifying the answers to the question whether the EEAS has been able to 
create policy convergence, a gap between the respondents who work for the member 
states and the respondents working for the EU institutions emerges.  
EEAS officials do discern a tendency towards more vertical coherence among the 
member states, only they consider this process to be work in progress: because the 
EEAS is still a very young organisation, it has not yet been able to draft policies on 
certain issues. More time is necessary to do this. Moreover, in their eyes, the HRVP 
still lacks a clear EU mandate to act towards, for example, Russia and China. When 
these important strategic partners are involved, the larger member states themselves 
still use their own diplomatic channels and political representatives. This will change 
in due time, they state, when the EEAS has developed a solid underlying policy 
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framework. What is more, on issues like Bosnia the HRVP has been able to operate 
autonomously (interview with Koetsenruijter). Therefore, in the eyes of the EEAS 
officials, the current situation is already much more coherent than before the 
establishment of the EEAS and will continue to go in that direction.  
The respondents working as national representatives point in a different direction. 
They emphasize the current paradigm of ‘renationalisation of foreign policy’ in 
international relations (interview with a diplomat at the permanent representation of 
the Netherlands to the EU; interview with an official of the ministry of foreign affairs 
of the Netherlands). The literature seems to confirm their stance.  
 
“. . . at a time of re-nationalization of foreign policy such as the current one, 
when [member states] are unlikely to seek greater integration in foreign policy as 
well as in other policy areas, unless they are induced to do so by an immediate 
necessity” (Comelli & Matarazzo, 2011, p. 4).  
 
Indeed, member states seem to operate in a reactive manner: a concrete problem (like 
an emerging conflict) or initiative of another actor is required in order for them to 
become active. An example of this is the conflict situation in Mali, where France took 
the initiative to act (interview with a diplomat at the permanent representation of the 
Netherlands to the EU).  
Here, again, we should consider the political will of the member states to engage in 
European foreign policy-making. Political will of the member states is necessary to 
ensure coherence (interview with Sohlstrom, Gebrandrij & Fernández-Mazarambroz y 
de Arespacochaga).  
 88 
Therefore, although the EEAS may be fully equipped with ingenious organisational 
structures that, in theory, enhance vertical coherence, these structures mean nothing 
without the political will of the member states to use them. As MEP Van Baalen puts 
it:  
 
“The EEAS is an organisational solution to a political problem. That is in itself 
a flaw of the European foreign policy-making system. In general, I identify the 
tendency to start reorganising the decision-making process when actors cannot 
find common ground politically. That, however, will not solve the core 
problems facing a common policy” (interview with Van Baalen).12 
 
Another reason for the broadly shared contention that the EEAS has not enhanced 
foreign policy convergence of the member states to a considerable degree, is that the 
process of policy convergence13 was already taking place in the framework of the 
Council since long before the establishment of the EEAS. Therefore, the EEAS could 
not really alter it (Balfour & Raik, 6).  
However, the EEAS did substantially effectuate foreign policy convergence in the 
policies of the new member states that joined the EU with the Southern, Northern and 
Eastern enlargements. These governments had not been part of the process of 
European policy adaption yet, and therefore had to change their policies considerably 
(Balfour & Raik, 6). 
When asked to identify the policy areas on which the foreign policies of the member 
states differ most, all respondents mention the Middle East and, in particular, the 
conflict between Israel and Palestine. 
                                   
12 The author translated Mr. Van Baalen’s answer from Dutch to English. 
13 Balfour and Raik (2013) call this process ‘Europeanisation’.  
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Thus, we may conclude, while member states are supportive of the EEAS as an 
institution and its Delegations in particular, they do not feel the political need to bring 
their foreign policies more in line with each other. Their core national preferences 
remain the same. Therefore, most member states do promote leadership from the 
HRVP in the world, but each member state would like to see this leadership in its 
preferred areas: for France, Africa and security and defence would constitute such 
areas, while the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden would like to see leadership in 
human rights (Balfour & Raik, 8).  
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4.7. EEAS agency slippage in vertical coherence? 
As was stated above, the EEAS has, in the few years of its existence, already 
developed its own foreign policy agenda, which it seeks to promote during meetings 
of the Council preparatory bodies. Therefore, a degree of agency slippage in vertical 
coherence is already taking place.  
Moreover, agency slippage is also promoted by the information asymmetry and 
agenda setting role that the HRVP and EEAS can rely upon. What is more, the EU 
Delegations form a suitable instrument to enlarge the autonomy of the EEAS as an 
institution.  
Although there may be agency slippage, the foreign policy preferences of the EU 
member states still differ on a number of foreign policy issues. Therefore, one should 
not expect too much of the EEAS when it comes to enhancing coherence among the 
member states.  
Still, the agent autonomy that the EEAS has been able to offset some of the negative 
effects of the diverging policy preferences of the member states and thereby create a 
relative enhancement of vertical coherence in comparison to a situation without 
HRVP and EEAS. 
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5. Horizontal coherence 
As the foreign policy-making competences of the European Union are divided over 
various institutions and organizations, there is a special need for horizontal coherence 
to ensure an effective European foreign policy.  
The EEAS faces challenges of both inter-institutional and intra-institutional horizontal 
coherence. Problems of intra-institutional nature are normal, in the sense that every 
ministry of foreign affairs or large public sector organization faces them at one point 
or another. In this sense, the EEAS is no different.  
This changes, however, when considering inter-institutional coherence, as the EEAS 
operates within the complex and unique structure of European Union decision-
making. Apart from the member states, the entities with foreign policy competences 
are the European Council and its President, the HRVP with the support of the EEAS, 
the Council of Ministers, the European Commission and, to a modest degree, the 
European Parliament. It is the task of the EEAS to coordinate, initiate, prepare and 
implement policies of all these institutions. It should not be surprising to the reader 
that, given the number of actors and procedures involved, this is not an easy task.  
In theory, the system is designed to function. However, if the chemistry between the 
enumerated people and institutions would disappear and a situation of turf wars would 
emerge, European foreign policy formulation would be very difficult.  
Unfortunately, such turf wars have proved not to be merely a theoretical possibility. 
During the 1990’s, inter-institutional squabbling, created by differentiated 
institutions’ powers, led to an increasing fragmentation of EU external relations 
(Hillion, 2008).  
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Moreover, the very establishment of the EEAS went, as we have seen, accompanied 
by a display of great inter-institutional rivalry, particularly visible through the battle 
of resources during the negotiations on the EEAS (interview with Tibbels).  
Arguably the most important change of the Treaty of Lisbon with regard to horizontal 
coherence is the establishment of the HRVP. Her function forms a horizontal bridge 
between the intergovernmental and supranational policy spheres.  
The ‘bridge’ that the HRVP constitutes has, however, become a species of institution  
itself. “The . . . High Representative and its administrative substructure, the External 
Action Service, are meant to overcome problems by introducing further mechanisms 
of coordination. Indeed, by fusing existing institutions into the new High 
Representative and the EEAS, coordination between institutions is transferred to new 
institutions” (Portela & Raube, 2009, p. 19).  
In my opinion, it is important legitimate to ask the question whether the involvement 
of more institutions in an already complex decision-making system will be able to 
lead to more coherence. The present chapter seeks to address that question. 
Just like the section on vertical coherence, this section will start by indicating a 
number of EEAS practices through which horizontal coherence may be enhanced. 
The second section will observe horizontal inter-institutional coherence in a number 
of key policy areas. It is sensible to consider horizontal coherence in this fashion, 
because the institutional balance of powers varies greatly per policy area. It is like 
Hillion wisely pointed out: “the powers and role of each institution vary depending on 
the EU sub-order in which it acts, and on the subject-matter of the action within each 
of these sub-orders. (Hillion, 2008, p. 32).  
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5.1. Practices enhancing horizontal coherence 
It is now appropriate to concisely explain the decision-making procedure through 
which the European Commission operates, as horizontal coherence mainly concerns 
interactions between the Commission and the EEAS.  
The Commission performs its role of executive through the ‘co-decision’ procedure14. 
In a very simplified form, the co-decision procedure works like this: First, the 
Commission presents a policy proposal. Then, the European Parliament takes the 
proposal under consideration and amends it where it deems that necessary. After this, 
the proposal returns to the Commission, which elaborates the amendments of the 
European Parliament into a new proposal. This proposal is send to the Council for a 
first reading. The Council can now adopt the proposal by different voting regimes 
according to the policy area of the proposal. When it does not adopt the proposal, the 
cycle starts again. 
Politically, the most important measure that should ensure horizontal coherence 
between the Commission and the EEAS is the ‘inter-service consultation’. Inter-
service consultation already formed a part of the co-decision procedure before the 
Treaty of Lisbon. It obliged the Commission, before supplying a proposal to the 
European Parliament for the first time, to run a consultation process among its own 
different departments in order to ensure that all aspects of the proposal under 
consideration were taken into account (European Commission website).  
When the EEAS was established, the inter-service consultation came to include 
consultation with the EEAS on matters with external relations implications. Hence, 
every proposal of the Commission in the sphere of foreign policy must formally first 
                                   
14 The formal name of this procedure is “ordinary legislative procedure”.  
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be considered by the EEAS. Only after the signature of the HRVP is placed, may the 
policy proposal continue its journey through the co-decision procedure.  
Politically, the inter-service consultation is significant. On a practical level, however, 
it looses importance because many formal and informal coordination processes exist 
between the EEAS and the Commission that should ensure coordination already 
before the definitive version of the policy proposal is drafted. Only in that fashion 
may true synergy among the institutions exist.  
One of the most important of those coordination processes is formed by the so-called 
‘country teams’. For every country of the world with which the EU has relations, a 
country team exist. Meetings of the country teams are attended by all EU officials that 
deal with the country under consideration, whether working at the EEAS or at the 
Commission. The country teams normally convene once in the three to four months. 
Some officials stress the importance of these meetings for good coordination of 
policies and networking and socialization with officials from other institutions (Grevi, 
2013). During the last years, the staff members of the Commission have proven to be 
loyal visitors of the country teams (interview with Koetsenruijter).  
For coordination of the relations with a number of important strategic partners, a more 
intensive coordination mechanism exists: the ‘inter-service group’. The several inter-
service groups meet on a much more frequent basis than the country teams, allowing 
for a more comprehensive inter- and intra-institutional coordination. Attendees of the 
inter-service groups are heads of division of the relevant services of the EEAS and of 
the Commission. The inter-service group on Russia, for example, is attended by heads 
of division of the Commission DGs Trade, Energy, Development and Research. 
During inter-service groups, the state of play with regard to the strategic partner is 
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reviewed and particular issues at stake are discussed in order to develop common 
stances among all EU staff concerned.  
The inter-service groups are an important innovation of the EEAS, which has been 
able to deliver good results on horizontal coherence. Its main merit is the ‘hands on’ 
and informal working atmosphere. Memos of the meetings are distributed internally, 
but not published. This makes the discussions during the meetings less politically 
sensitive (interview with Pulch). The reason that inter-service groups exclusively exist 
for the relations with a limited number of strategic partners is that it would cost 
Commission staff too much time to attend inter-service groups on all regions. It is 
good, therefore, to retain the ‘exclusive’ status of the inter-service group mechanism.  
The inter-service group meetings are also replicated on Director-General level. These 
meetings, at which much less people are present than at the inter-service groups 
themselves, apply a broader view to the process of horizontal cooperation, in order to 
ensure that horizontal coherence is not discredited (interview with Pulch).  
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5.2. Inter-institutional horizontal coherence: the different policy fields. 
 
5.2.1. Trade 
Trade policy is traditionally a communautarian competence. Still today, the 
Commission has full responsibility on trade matters. When negotiations with third 
countries are purely about trade, the Commission is the only European actor present. 
This has enabled the Commission to engage in agency slippage and enlarge its role. 
“[The Commission’s] position as a negotiator offers certain advantages (in terms of 
information and expertise), which allows it to push through its own preferences” 
(Reynaert, 2012).  
However, trade is a policy area with strong external relations implications. For that 
reason the EEAS must also be involved to ensure that the trade agreements that the 
Commission concludes, are coherent with the EU’s policies on e.g. human rights and 
other political matters.  
Within the EEAS, only one person is tasked with trade coordination: Mr. Houttuin. 
Mr. Houttuin has been a respondent for my research and provided some interesting 
information on the coordination between the Commission and the EEAS on trade.  
When it comes to coordination on trade, the working relations between the 
Commission and the EEAS are very pleasant. Mr. Houttuin has direct contacts with 
the Cabinet of Trade Commissioner De Gught, with which matters are quite quickly 
and efficiently coordinated (interview with Houttuin).  
As the Commission shows some reluctance to work with the EEAS on other areas of 
Community policy (like development cooperation), the smooth cooperation on trade 
issues seems remarkable. It might be argued, however, that cooperation on trade 
matters goes well because the EEAS does not constitute a serious ‘threat’ to the 
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monopoly of the Commission on this policy field, as only one person is tasked with 
trade coordination in the EEAS.  
On trade matters, again, the role of the EU Delegations should not be downplayed. 
Before the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified, the EU Delegations consisted solely of 
Commission staff. In the present situation, the EEAS adds CFSP/ESDP functions to 
the Delegations. Therefore, automatically, the EEAS’ influence on trade matters is 
enlarged when it comes to monitoring trade agreements and conducting negotiations 
in third countries. 
When negotiations with third countries are purely about trade matters, only the 
Commission is present from the European side. However, with an increasing number 
of countries the EU has free trade agreements to which political agreements are 
attached: This is the ‘new style’ of EU trade policy. Therefore, the EEAS is present at 
most of the trade negotiations. After the conclusion of a set of negotiations, the EEAS 
and the Commission present a common document that presents both political and 
economic aspects.  
A good example of how politics and trade are interwoven is the lifting of the 
Generalized System of Preference (GSP) for Sri Lanka.15 The EU Delegation found 
out that Sri Lanka was violating human rights and therefore should be sanctioned by 
the ending of the GSP in trade relations with the EU. The eventual lifting of the GSP 
was the result of synergies between the EEAS and the Commission (interview with 
Houttuin).  
Dutch MEP Van Baalen also noted that allowing the EEAS to complement the 
process of trade negotiations is of added value. Mr. Van Baalen was present during 
trade negotiations with Japan. He observes: 
                                   
15 The GSP is a tariff system applied to developing countries, which removes tariff barriers for trade 
with the EU.  
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“During those negotiations, I have observed how the EEAS can make a 
difference. The EU has more to speak about with Japan than just trade matters. 
Because of the EEAS there are now extensive contacts between the trade 
representative, who works for DG Trade of the Commission, and EEAS 
diplomats that deal with issues like security or culture”  (interview with Van 
Baalen).16 
 
However, Mr. Van Baalen did emphasize that this coordination process functioned 
well at the mercy of the fact that there are no fundamental differences of opinion 
between the EU member states on relations with Japan. In general, Mr. Van Baalen is 
therefore more positive about horizontal coherence than about vertical coherence. The 
reason for this is that horizontal coherence is merely a bureaucratic process, whereas 
to achieve vertical coherence, political agreement among the member states is 
necessary.  
 
5.2.2. Development cooperation 
In the area of development cooperation, one of the most complex cooperation 
structures between the EEAS and the Commission was put into place.  
Already in the era that the Commission had full competences in the sphere of 
development cooperation, coordination challenges existed as EU development 
cooperation should be complementary to that of the member states (Art. 210 TFEU). 
Moreover, the financial implementation of development cooperation is practiced 
through a considerable amount of different financial instruments. 
                                   
16 The author translated Mr. Van Baalen’s statement from Dutch to English. 
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The abundance of financial programming instruments poses challenges to horizontal 
coherence. “The complexity of the programming cycle, where both the EEAS and 
DEVCO are leading on different steps, makes regular information exchange and good 
collaboration more important – and more complicated” (Julian, 2012). However, this 
regular information exchange and good collaboration are still problematic in the case 
of development cooperation. Although the EEAS received considerable 
responsibilities in planning development cooperation and allocating development 
funds (Art. 9, Council Decision L201), the Commission generally feels that 
development policy still belongs essentially within its own competences (interview 
with Koetsenruijter; interview with Houttuin).  
It is appropriate here to shortly consider the delimitation of competences between the 
EEAS and the Commission in development policy.  
First and foremost, final responsibility on development remains with the Commission. 
Additionally, the implementation of development programmes also falls under the 
responsibility of DEVCO. The EEAS would have far too little manpower to do 
implementation, as only eleven people work in the EEAS’s development cooperation 
division.  
The EEAS has a role in programming of financial aid instruments for the Multi-
annual Financial Framework (MFF) of the EU. This role gives the EEAS power over 
the contents of development policy. Two prominent development funding instruments 
are the European Development Fund (EDF), which is concerned with aid to the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, and the Development Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI), which finances aid to the rest of the world. These instruments 
themselves, however, remain under the responsibility of the Development 
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Commissioner. In total, there are nine instruments for which the EEAS does the 
programming in cooperation with the Commission:  
 
1. ENI (European Neighbourhood Instrument)  
2. INSC (Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation) 
3. DCI (Development Coordination Instrument)  
4. EDF (European Development Fund) 
5. EIDHR (European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights) 
6. IFS (Instrument for Stability) 
7. PI (Partnership Instrument) 
8. IPA (Instrument Pre-Accession Assistance) 
9. Instrument for Greenland (interview with Sohlstrom, Gerbrandij & Fernández-
Mazarambroz y de Arespacochaga).17 
 
Programming for these instruments is tackled via so-called ‘complementarity 
meetings’. Before the establishment of the EEAS, each of the nine programmes 
worked independently on making budget-plans for the MFF. No coordination at all 
between those programs took place. Now, the EEAS brings all the programmes 
together in its headquarter building.  
Significantly, during complementarity meetings a voice is also given to the regional 
desks of the EEAS, so that programming of development cooperation now happens on 
the basis of more background information concerning politics, the economy and the 
human rights situation of a third country (Interview with Solhstrom, Gerbrandij & 
Fernández-Mazarambroz y de Arespochaga).  
                                   
17 For more information on the planning and financing of EU development cooperation, visit: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/index_en.htm 
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Once the programming documents are drafted by the EEAS and the Commission, 
these documents are send to the EU Delegation in the designated partner countries, so 
that EU officials working there can make additional suggestions and modifications. 
An example that shows why complementarity meetings are necessary is the 
hierarchical manner in which, before the EEAS was established, Brussels decided 
about the distribution of money over the different expenses of EU Delegations in 
partner countries. At that time, there was considerable incoherence between what the 
EU Delegation’s policy was (based on what they saw as necessary in the country), 
and what the different policy funding instruments in Brussels had negotiated.  
Thus, with regard to these complementarity meetings it is clear that the EEAS has 
positive effects on horizontal coherence. (Interview with Sohlstrom, Gerbrandij & 
Fernández-Mazarambroz de Arespochaga).  
However, this progress is ambiguous. Sohlstrom, Gebrandij and Fernández-
Mazarambroz y de Arespochaga, who are seconded to the EEAS as national experts 
concerned with development cooperation, all agree that the advent of the EEAS itself 
has not made the programming in development cooperation easier. In their eyes, it 
would have been simplest if the complementarity meetings would have been added to 
the old Commission structure, because in the current situation new challenges of 
inter-institutional coherence have emerged, which would not have been present if 
DEVCO would have retained its monopoly on development cooperation.  
Moreover, they note that the Commission still harbours some suspicion concerning 
the agenda of the EEAS, although it would never admit this in official 
communications.  
In this respect, it is noticeable that the old pillar-structure implicitly persists. 
“Information sharing on a certain policy area is not easy for the Commission. That is 
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just not something that is in the blood of the Commission” (interview with Sohlstrom, 
Gerbrandij & Fernández-Mazarambroz y de Arespochaga).  
 
5.2.3. Sanctions 
The imposition of sanctions forms one of the few terrains on which the establishment 
of the EEAS has been evidently beneficial to horizontal coherence. This is in itself 
important, as the imposition of sanctions of economic, military or visa ban nature on 
third countries is one of the most effective instruments the EU has to assert political 
influence in the international sphere.  
The procedure of imposing sanctions has always been characterized by a dual nature: 
First, the imposition of sanctions was determined by a political decision, taken by the 
member states in the Council of Ministers. Second, the implementation and 
monitoring of sanctions was carried out by the Commission when it concerned trade 
sanctions, and by the member states when it concerned military sanctions or visa ban 
sanctions.  
This method of the imposition of sanctions has been labelled the ‘two steps 
procedure’. Before the establishment of the EEAS, it was one of the areas on which 
considerable horizontal incoherence existed (Portela & Raube, 2009, pp. 12-13). In 
those times, DG Relex of the Commission was not substantially involved in the 
process. It had merely an advising role.  
However, the establishment of the EEAS entailed a legal basis for the community’s 
foreign service to be involved throughout the entire policy process. Therefore, the 
sanctions department of the EEAS eased up the process considerably.  
At present, a sanctions dossier moves to the desk of the EEAS right after a political 
decision has been taken by the Council of Ministers. The EEAS then drafts a proposal 
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on the nature of the sanctions. It does so on the basis of talks with the Council of 
Ministers and with the Commission, both conducted by the EEAS. Once the EEAS 
proposal is drafted, a judicial working group considers it. After this, the proposal 
returns to the Council of Ministers where it may be adopted. Hence, the EEAS has 
improved coordination in the first half of the ‘two steps procedure’ (interview with a 
policy officer of the EEAS).  
However, perhaps the most important contribution to horizontal coherence follows in 
realm of the ‘second step’: the implementation and monitoring of the sanctions. 
Although this is still done by the Commission, the Commission department 
responsible for sanctions policy is located in the EEAS building, on the same floor as 
the EEAS sanctions department. This service, the Service for Foreign Policy 
Instruments (FPI), falls directly under the competence of the HRVP. In practice, 
therefore, there is no real distinction between the FPI and the EEAS sanctions 
department, which makes questions of coordination redundant and ensures almost 
complete horizontal coherence on the terrain of sanctions (interview with a policy 
officer of the EEAS).  
 
5.2.4. Neighbourhood Policy 
A similar situation exists in the field of neighbourhood policy. The EEAS department 
on enlargement is the only service working for Commissioner Füle, who is in charge 
of enlargement and neighbourhood policy. Commissioner Füle does have a 
Commission DG for enlargement, but not for neighbourhood policy. Thence, the 
EEAS serves both the HRVP and the Commissioner for Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood policy, when it comes to neighbourhood matters. Predominantly, the 
European Neighbourhood Policy division of the EEAS serves Füle and Ashton, but 
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also other EEAS divisions that deal with the neighbourhood regions fall under both 
EEAS and Commission command (interview with Tibbels). 
This situation has been used by the EEAS division on neighbourhood policy to push 
for more coherence within the Commission itself, by putting neighbourhood policy 
topics on the agenda of talks with other DGs, like DG Trade. “More than other policy 
frameworks could do this, we have been able to enhance inter-institutional and intra-
institutional coherence” (interview with Tibbels).  
On neighbourhood policy, horizontal coherence has been institutionalised through 
regular meetings on different levels. First, there are meetings between Commissioner 
Füle and the head of the neighbourhood policy team of the EEAS. Second, there are 
meetings between the cabinets of Ashton and Füle, and the EEAS managing directors, 
directors and heads of division concerned with neighbouring countries. Finally, there 
are meetings between the EEAS Chief Operating Officer and the head of the 
neighbourhood policy team to ensure that the practical aspects of neighbourhood 
policy are implemented correctly (interview with Tibbels).  
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5.3. Intra-institutional coherence 
The question of intra-institutional coherence is perhaps less interesting for this thesis, 
as every public sector organisation has to deal with intra-institutional coherence. 
Similar to the EEAS, all national foreign ministries face the challenge of coordinating 
policies between regional desks, thematic desks, the postings and the other 
operational structures (interview with Pulch).  
Nevertheless, there are some interesting observations to make about intra-institutional 
coherence and the EEAS.  
First, there is a division between two camps of EEAS officials that have different a 
different opinion about the role and scope of the EEAS. One school of EEAS officials 
is content with the EEAS’ formal role of coordinating policy processes between the 
EU institutions. The other school consists of officials who envision a more proactive 
role for the EEAS; a role of initiating policy and guiding the foreign policy path of 
the EU (interview with a policy officer of the EEAS). Hence, there is a lack of clarity 
about the role that the EEAS should play among the proper personnel.  
Second, the different policy areas on which the EEAS is active all entail very different 
methods of working and procedures. On some policy areas, like sanctions and 
neighbourhood policy, the EEAS enjoys higher levels of agency slippage than on 
other areas, like development and trade. Moreover, each policy area deals with 
different inter-institutional balances vis-à-vis the Commisison and the Council, 
considering levels of cooperation and budget dependence. Instead of Furness’ idea of 
the EEAS becoming a ‘double agent’, the present situation may have led the EEAS to 
become a ‘multiform agent’.  
Thirdly, the staff of the EEAS is of a very pluriform nature.  
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Combining the above three factors, one comes to the conclusion that the EEAS is not 
an intra-institutionally coherent organisation.  
Ironically enough, however, the EEAS may have actually fostered intra-institutional 
coherence in the European Commission. The coordination mechanisms that the EEAS 
developed in order to cooperate better with the European Commission were partly 
copied by the Commission and applied within its own institutional infrastructure. This 
happened, for example, with the complementarity meetings that the EEAS conducts 
when engaged in programming the financial instruments for development 
cooperation. After the EEAS introduced the practice, the Commission took it over and 
applied it to MFF budgetary planning itself (interview with Sohlstrom, Gerbrandij & 
Fernández-Mazarambroz y de Arespochaga).  
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5.4. EEAS Personnel 
The interview respondents of this thesis were generally not very optimistic about the 
ability of the EEAS staff to foster intra-institutional horizontal coherence.  
Especially at the EU Delegations, a ‘silo-mentality’ is visible among the Commission 
staff, the Council staff and the EEAS staff. At the EU Delegations normally only one 
third of the staff works for the EEAS. The rest concerns detached personnel from the 
Commission. The latter remain dependent on the Commission for promotion. 
Therefore, it is hard to bind these people to the EEAS. 
Personnel working at the EU Delegations report back to their own institution, whether 
that is the Commission or the EEAS, rather than all reporting back to the EEAS 
(interview with Houttuin; interview with a policy officer of the EEAS).   
At EEAS headquarters, the situation is less negative than at the Delegations. The main 
reason is that only EEAS staff works at the headquarters in Brussels. Before, 
however, these people worked for the Commission, the Council or the member states. 
Some people who work for the EEAS now feel more ‘EEAS’ than ‘former 
Commission’ or ‘former Council’. A common institutional culture is thus in 
fabrication. This is different in the case of the seconded staff from the member states, 
who really feel like a different species (interview with Tibbels).  
At the same time, it is still very discernable that the staff of the EEAS comes from 
three different sources. Staff members who formerly worked at the Commission or the 
Council remain using their previous networks. Hence, there is still difference between 
those who are in their blood more communautaire and those who favour a more 
intergovernmental road (interview with Pulch; interview with a policy officer of the 
EEAS). 
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Moreover, the establishment of the EEAS has also made the inter-institutional 
exchange of officials more difficult. It is still very difficult to do a transfer from the 
Commission to the EEAS and vice-versa. This does not contribute to horizontal 
coherence, for “it is good to have a cross-fertilization of officials working in different 
policy frameworks”, and it is also important that sufficient former Commission staff 
remains employed within the EEAS, because the communautairian competences are 
very important for the member states  (interview with Tibbels; interview with Pulch).  
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5.5. Pillar structure in disguise?  
It may be concluded that there is room for improvement concerning horizontal 
coherence in EU foreign policies. There is a certain degree of inter-institutional 
distrust, mainly from the Commission towards the EEAS. The other actors in EU 
foreign policy are suspicious about the actual agenda of the EEAS, and sometimes 
look upon the organization as an extension of the member states’ preferences.  
Moreover, the formally abandoned pillar-stucture is implicitly still present. The 
former intergovernmental and supranational realms are not used to cooperating with a 
third actor: the EEAS. This is especially the case with regard to the more 
communautarian policy areas like development and crisis management. On 
traditionally intergovernmental areas like sanctions and defence, there are less 
horizontal coordination problems. The reason for this may be that the Council is less 
suspicious of the agenda of the EEAS than the Commission.  
Additionally, the persistence of the pillar-structure is also visible in the operational 
procedures of foreign policy.  
Firstly, although most foreign policy activities are bundled under the EEAS, budget 
lines are still very pillar-oriented. For example, the EEAS structure prepares EU 
military and humanitarian missions, but the Council pays them. Similarly, election-
monitoring missions are organized by the EEAS, but they fall under the budget of the 
Commission (interview with a policy officer of the EEAS). In Delegations, the EEAS 
has to deal with different and often complex budget procedures, given different 
sources of the available budget. (interview with Pulch).  
Secondly, the Council still employs much administrative staff that supports the 
member states in EU foreign policy-making. Although EEAS representatives chair 
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these meetings are still written by the Council secretariat, which also supplies the 
minutes to the member states (interview with a policy officer of the EEAS).  
Considering the above, it is thus possible to speak about an implicit pillar-structure. 
According to Reynaert (2012), the implicit pillar-structure was kept intact because the 
existing European foreign policy actors were reluctant to give up their competences 
during the bargaining process on the establishment of the EEAS: “. . . because the 
European Commission and the EU member states already have an important influence 
in the decision-making processes of these different policies, we can expect the 
decisions regarding the transfer of responsibilities to the EEAS to be difficult for 
these actors” (Reynaert, 2012, p. 213-214). This why the Commission insisted on 
retaining its competences on e.g. development cooperation, thereby creating one of 
the most complicated inter-institutional programming processes thinkable.  
However, the implicit pillar structure is still often being kept intact by the member 
states, who have come accustomed to dealing with two different paradigms when 
dealing with the European Union (interview with Koetsenruijter). The ministries of 
foreign affairs are designed to deal with both the intergovernmental and the 
supranational realm, but they are not yet used to working with the EEAS. The Dutch 
ministry of foreign affairs still telephones the European Commission when questions 
regarding development or neighbourhood policy arise (interview with an official of 
the ministry of foreign affairs of the Netherlands).  
Considering all this, we have to agree with the view of Michael Smith, who argues 
that an “institutionalisation of hybridity” (Smith, 2012, p. 702) has been effectuated 
since the Treaty of Maastricht. Therefore, “the EU’s foreign policy is now 
characterized by an even more complex institutional framework. . . and horizontal 
coherence and consistency have not increased compared to the period before the 
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EEAS and the position of High Representative were created” (Reynaert, 2012, p. 
226).  
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6. External coherence  
The European Union’s bargaining power in international politics is strongly 
dependent on the way the EU presents itself to the outside world. It is a widespread 
assumption that a single voice on the world stage will increase the EU’s power and 
leverage (Drieskens, 2008). External coherence refers to the degree to which the EU 
is able to utter this single voice.   
Perhaps it is self-evident, but external coherence is strongly dependent on internal 
coordination processes. After all, before an actor can send a clear position to the 
outside world, it must be sure what its own position actually is.  
Moreover, the actor needs sufficient authority to engage in proficient external 
representation. Along the lines of PA-theory, it means that the principals need to 
delegate authority to their agent so that this agent can start representing them. In the 
case of the EU, the EEAS is the agent of the member states and of the European 
institutions. Therefore, external coherence is the culmination point of both vertical 
and horizontal coherence.  
Furthermore, in order to engage in successful representation of its principals, the 
EEAS also needs a basic level of recognition and acceptance from third countries and 
other international actors. This has not always been easy.  
This section will investigate whether the EEAS has been able to improve external 
representation of the EU in comparison with the situation before its establishment. In 
the first place, it will do so by considering the level of authority the EEAS has 
received from the member states and the Commission on external representation. In 
second place, this section will consider the role of representation that the EEAS can 
play at international organizations. After than, it will consider the merits of the EU 
Delegations in external coherence.  
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Finally, a crucial question to answer is whether the EEAS is able to enhance external 
coherence while good vertical and/or horizontal coherence are still lacking. If that 
would be the case, agency slippage has almost certainly taken place.  
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6.1. EEAS vs. the member states and the Commission 
Concerning the EU’s external representation, there has been much disagreement and a 
long process of negotiations between, on the one hand, the member states and the 
EEAS and, on the other hand, the EEAS and the European institutions.  
Discussions with the member states focused on the scope of responsibilities of the EU 
Delegations and the competences of the EEAS and the HRVP to voice common 
positions on behalf of the member states.  
Discussions with the European institutions were mainly about the division of 
competences in external representation. Whereas the idea behind the HRVP and the 
EEAS was to create a single voice on all external issues of the EU, the Commission 
insisted on keeping its own representation on communautarian matters. 
Essentially, both sets of discussions concerned one issue: whether the treaties should 
be interpreted with regard to their broader goals or with regard to the literal 
formulation (interview with a diplomat at the permanent representation of the 
Netherlands to the EU).  
One of the most obvious improvements for external coherence is that it is now, 
formally, one person who represents the EU towards the outside world on foreign 
policy issues: the HRVP (interview with Van Baalen).18 The HRVP has to share her 
position on the world stage with the President of the European Council, but he  
represents the Union mostly at a higher level (Art. 15.6 TEU).  
Indeed, the intention behind the creation of the HRVP was supplying the EU with a 
single representative on foreign policy matters, similar to a foreign minister. Article 
18.4 of the TEU states that the HRVP “shall be responsible within the Commission 
                                   
18 In the old situation, there were three representatives on foreign policy: the High Representative for 
CFSP, the rotating Presidency and the Relex commissioner.  
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for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other 
aspects of the Union’s external action.”  
On representing the external implications of Community policies, this leaves not 
much room for the President of the Commission. The latter, however, has displayed 
little intention of giving up his representative role on foreign policy matters since the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. This is curious, because the HRVP is also a member 
of the Commission. However, as Nuttall states,  
 
“[Another EU official who would want to represent himself internationally is]. . 
. the president of the Commission, who could be presumed to make up a single 
actor with the External Relations Commissioner but with the latter gone [into a 
merger with the HRVP] will assert his independence vis-à-vis the [HRVP], 
given the latter’s ambiguous position half in and half out of the Commission” 
(Nuttall, 2005, p. 109).  
 
So, where some contend that it was the intention of the treaties to have the HRVP 
represent the EU alone, the President of the Commission has time and again joined on 
state visits. As a justification of his presence, the Commission pointed to its 
competences on, for example, trade and development in the treaties (interview with a 
diplomat at the permanent representation of the Netherlands to the EU; interview with 
Koetsenruijter).  
The Commission has shown the same firmness on defending its treaty rights when it 
comes to trade negotiations. Instead of granting the EEAS the room to conduct (or 
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even be present at) trade negotiations, the Commission has made it impossible for the 
EEAS to perform a coordinating role here.19  
Some contend that if the general disposition to the treaties would have been different 
from the beginning, meaning that Van Rompuy or Ashton would have been granted 
the leeway to represent the EU alone, this would have also had influence on the lower 
levels, in the sense that the European institutions would have less vigorously defended 
their rights on matters of representation (interview with a diplomat at the permanent 
representation of the Netherlands to the EU).  
Constructing a single voice was not made very easy by the member states either. 
Predominantly on the matter of EU common positions the discussions have been 
difficult. Especially the United Kingdom refused to accept any EU common positions 
on matters of national competence. The UK dismissed several proposals by other 
member states and the EEAS for guidelines on EU representation at international 
organisations and in third countries.  
The result was, after more than a year of negotiation, that there was a much smaller 
scope for common external representation than before the Treaty of Lisbon. Finally, a 
set of guidelines was adopted. However, these guidelines are of a general nature and 
do not grant the EEAS much discretion in external representation (interview with a 
diplomat at the permanent representation of the Netherlands to the EU).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
19 As we have seen, the EEAS is allowed to join negotiations when other issues than purely trade 
matters are on the agenda.  
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6.2. External representation at international organisations  
The HRVP and the EEAS have the task of representing the EU at international 
organisations, when matters of CFSP/ESDP are concerned. The legal basis for this 
representation is Article 27.2 TEU: 
 
“The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the 
common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with 
third parties on the Union's behalf and shall express the Union's position in 
international organisations and at international conferences.” 
 
The European Union maintains contact with a large body of international 
organisations. A selection of the most important international organisations for the 
EU are the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe (interview with Pulch).  
Apart from the lack of full power delegation by the member states, the EEAS faces 
two more problems when representing the EU at international organisations. 
The first problem relates to the fact that other participants at international 
organisations may not support an enhanced role for the EU within the forum. Even the 
EU’s strategic partners have opposed enhanced representation on the level of the EU 
(interview with Pulch). As a matter of fact, China, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia and 
South Aftrica all voted against a UNGA resolution that proposed to upgrade the EU’s 
observer status at the UNGA (Gstöhl, 2012, pp. 160-161.)  
The second problem is the fact that the EU is not a state. International organisations 
were essentially created by states and for states. “As such, their internal rules rarely 
take into account the role of supranational organisations or the coordination of 
policies among groups of member states” (Comelli & Matarazzo, 2011, pp. 5-6). 
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The problem, according to Mr. Pulch, is that other states do not understand that the 
EU is different from other regional organisations, in that it has truly supranational 
powers that other regional groupings like ASEAN lack. “The EU is a unique 
international organisation. For that reason, it is sometimes difficult to understand for 
other states why they should grant the EU space at international organisations, 
alongside 28 member states that also want to speak and take part” (interview with 
Pulch).  
For the reasons stated above, the EU has gone through a long and difficult process at 
the UNGA in order to upgrade its status. In 2011, eventually, the EU received an 
enhanced observer status at the UN. This status allows the EU to participate in 
debates at the UNGA, to exercise the right to reply on EU positions and to circulate 
proposals on behalf of the member states. The EU may not, however, vote or put 
forward candidates (Gstöhl, 2012).  
At other international organisations, like the NATO, the World Bank and the UNSC 
the EU enjoys no observer status at all.   
On the other hand, the EU is also a full member of some international organisations, 
like the WTO, FAO and OECD. The latter organisations are mostly concerned with 
matters on which the EU enjoys supranational powers, like agriculture (FAO) or the 
common market (WTO).  
Although the Treaty of Lisbon formally enhanced external representation of the EU 
by empowering the HRVP to do this, the effects of the treaty were not uniformly 
positive. There were advantages of the representation system prior to Lisbon, 
especially because the EU is not a state. Before the ratification of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the state holding the rotating Presidency spoke on behalf of the EU at 
international organisations. The Presidency, being a sovereign state, could benefit 
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from the rights associated with being a full member of most international 
organisations in question (Comelli, 2011). These benefits fell away for the EU with 
the empowerment of the HRVP/EEAS.  
Furthermore, although EU level representation is now conducted by a special agency, 
this does not mean that the EU member states also bring their preferences more in line 
with each other than before. Taking the UN as an example, the EU member states do 
not necessarily vote uniformly, especially on issues concerning the Middle East. In 
fact, a study by Molnár showed that the Treaty of Lisbon, “although significantly 
changing the structure of the EU’s external representation,” did not have any effect on 
the voting pattern of the EU member states. Diplomatic state-centrism remained the 
leading paradigm (Molnár, 2012, p. 347).  
Yet, the benefits of EU level representation remain considerable. The most important 
benefit may be the fact that one person (the HRVP) conducts the political dialogue 
with third parties and represents the EU at international conferences (Gstöhl, 2012). 
Second, the coordinating role that the EEAS as supporting office can play is also of 
great value for external coherence.  By chairing the Correspondence United Nations 
working group (CONUN) in Brussels, the EEAS coordinates the EU positions at the 
UN. Additionally, more than 1300 EU coordination meetings are annually conducted 
by the EU Delegation to the UN in New York, on top of around 1000 of these 
meetings at the UN in Geneva.  
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6.3. EU Delegations 
Quite obviously, the EU Delegations play a considerable role in representing the EU 
externally. The Treaty of Lisbon supplied the EU Delegations with more tools to 
become agents of the EU. As they gained a political task next to their responsibilities 
of ‘trade and aid’, they may now engage in political discussions with governments of 
the third countries in which they are stationed. Moreover, Heads of Delegations have 
the right of demarche over EU member state ambassadors (Furness, 2011).  
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6.4. Agency slippage in external coherence? 
The HRVP and the EEAS have faced some resistance during the project of setting up 
a solid EU-level external representation. Predominantly on the issues of EU common 
positions and the representation of the EU at international organisations, some 
member states have paralyzed the process of developing a new external representation 
by blocking decision-making in the Council of the EU.  
Additionally, the Commission has been very proactive in protecting its own external 
representation competences with regard to Community policies.  
Therefore, it could be argued that the principals of the EEAS delegated less authority 
to their agent when it comes to ensuring external coherence, compared with the other 
two dimensions of coherence.  
Nevertheless, the EEAS has displayed its capacity to enhance external coherence 
anyway, by coordinating the positions of EU member states at the EU Delegations 
and by presenting a uniform conversation partner to the outside world. Henry 
Kissinger’s question “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe” has been partially 
solved: “Call Ashton” would be a good answer.  
Finally, it is also possible to ensure external coherence through means that are more 
modest than direct diplomatic representation. Indeed, one could argue that the EEAS 
has also enhanced external coherence by writing the speeches and briefing notes for 
performances at international conferences and meetings of both the HRVP and the 
President of the European Council (interview with Koetsenruijter).  
In conclusion, the EEAS has been able to engage in ‘agency slippage’ in the field of 
the EU’s external representation. For, where it had little and conflicting mandates 
from the Principals to do this, it did considerably foster external coherence.  
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Conclusions 
 
If there is one certainty, it is the fact that the coherence of European foreign policy is 
itself far from ‘coherent’. It is a multifaceted concept that appears to various degrees 
in different corners of European foreign policy. 
The previous chapters have yielded some interesting answers to the hypotheses that 
were posed at the beginning of this thesis.  
 
Hypothesis 1 
The staff of the EEAS has very diverse origins, as it is made up of former 
personnel from the Commission, former personnel from the Council and 
seconded national diplomats. This diversity will predominantly enhance the 
EEAS’ potential to foster vertical coherence in European foreign policy, as it is 
to be expected that seconded national diplomats keep in contact with their home 
governments. 
 
Theoretical works written on the topic of organisational locus all agree with the 
contention of this hypothesis (Balfour & Raik, 2013; Bátora, 2011; Cherrier, 2012). 
However, the situation at the EEAS’ headquarter and Delegations, where the 
provenance of the personnel is very diverse, shows that although there is a friendly 
and collegial working atmosphere, it would not be correct to speak of a ‘European 
diplomatic culture’ or an esprit de corps. However, as we have stipulated, it is correct 
to speak of a unity in bureaucratic culture. Nevertheless, this is a result of the 
organisational structure of the EEAS rather than the diversity of its personnel. 
Therefore, we cannot provide a definite answer to the first hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 2 
The foreign policy preferences of the member states may be expected to vary 
considerably. The EEAS is expected to benefit from this interest heterogeneity 
among its principals, enabling it to augment its agent autonomy and foster 
vertical coherence in European foreign policy.  
 
This hypothesis cannot be affirmed nor rejected. Although the research indeed proved 
that there is considerable interest heterogeneity between the principals of the EEAS, 
the latter has not yet been able to increase its role to a considerable degree. 
Nevertheless, the process of agency slippage requires some time. Therefore, only time 
will tell whether the EEAS will be able to better exploit the interest heterogeneity of 
its principals in the future. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
There will be more agency slippage in areas where no supranational authority 
has yet been delegated to the Commission, because the Commission as a 
bureaucracy will do anything to protect its domain. Therefore, it will be easier 
for the EEAS to engage in agency slippage and thus enlarge its autonomy on 
CFSP matters than on former first policy issues.  
 
Indeed, the research shows that inter-institutional relations are most difficult in policy 
areas where the Commission has the most competences. An example of this is 
development cooperation. In this policy area, it still seems hard for the Commission to 
share all relevant information. However, in other policy areas like trade, this seems 
different. Therefore, a definite answer cannot be given to the hypothesis.  
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Concerning CFSP policy areas, the EEAS does enjoy more agent autonomy. Here, the 
EEAS can conveniently set the agenda through its chairmanship of the Council 
preparatory bodies. This part of the hypothesis can thus be affirmed.  
 
Hypothesis 4 
External representation is a competence that the member states most likely 
associate with their national sovereignty. Therefore, it is not likely that they will 
transfer enough competences to the EEAS to make external coherence a 
success.  
 
Some member states have shown great reluctance to empower the HRVP and the 
EEAS in areas of external representation, such as the formulation of EU common 
positions and the representations of the EU at international organisations. However, 
the mere fact that the HRVP and her foreign service now exist means a lot to the 
outside world.  
What is more, the EEAS seems to perform well in the field of external representation. 
The EU Delegations play an increasing role in information gathering and reporting. 
Moreover, extensive cooperation between the EU Delegations and the national 
diplomatic posts of the member states takes place. This ensures unity of external 
representation and directly fosters coherence. 
On the other hand, the representative function of the HRVP has been mitigated by the 
desire of Commission President Barroso to claim his international representation 
functions. This hypothesis can therefore be affirmed only partly. Over all, however, 
external coherence has been enhanced.  
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Hypothesis 5 
Combining the four hypotheses formulated above, it may be expected that 
vertical coherence will be the form of coherence that is enhanced most by the 
EEAS. 
 
Weighing the results of the research that was done for this thesis, it is my contention 
that external coherence has been enhanced most by the EEAS. Therefore, this 
hypothesis can be rejected. 
Nevertheless, vertical coherence comes in a good second place, as it has also been 
enhanced by the EEAS. With regard to vertical coherence, the EEAS has shown that 
it is capable of using its prime position with respect to, for example, information 
asymmetry, as it is now the largest participant in COREU correspondence. However, 
the main spoiler of vertical coherence is the lacking political will of the member states 
to continue integration in the area of a common foreign policy.  
In the field of external coherence, the EEAS has been able to engage in agency 
slippage. It has been able to do so because the ex ante controls and ex post controls 
are directed towards the headquarters of the EEAS, not to the EU Delegations. More 
generally, cross-border diplomacy is a process that is harder to monitor than the 
behaviour of an actor situated in a building literally in the middle between its most 
important principals.  
In 2011 the EU’s observer status at the UNGA was considerably enhanced. Moreover, 
the EU will appoint an ambassador to the OSCE for the first time later this year. 
Furthermore, significantly enough Catherine Ashton prioritizes her diplomatic 
function of ‘High Representative’ over her ‘Vice President’ or ‘Council Presidency’ 
functions. She constantly travels around the world to engage with global leaders at 
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crucial moments in order to provide the EU with a clear ‘single voice’ on the world 
stage and a coherent representation in the international community. In fact, at the very 
time of writing, HRVP Ashton is in Cairo to perform her best offices in an attempt to 
alleviate the conflict between the military and the government of that country. In 
other words: real progress is being made in the field of external coherence.  
Not less important is the fact that the interview respondents also identified external 
coherence as the type of coherence that was improved most by the EEAS. See the 
table 2 for their answers to the question: “Which type of coherence has been enhanced 
most by the EEAS?” 
Interview Respondent 
 
 
Vertical 
Coherence wins 
 
 
Horizontal 
Coherence wins 
 
 
External 
Coherence wins 
 
 
 
Mr. Koetsenruijter 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Sohlstrom 
 
 
did not vote 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Gerbrandij 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Fernández-
Mazarambroz y de 
 
did not vote 
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Arespochaga 
 
 
Mr. Pulch 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Tibbels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
Mr. Houttuin 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
A policy officer of the 
EEAS 
  x 
Official of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands 
  x 
Policy officer of the EEAS x   
Mr. Van Baalen   x 
Diplomat at the permanent 
representation of NL 
x   
Mr. Peresso   x 
TOTAL 5 0 6 
Table 2: Respondents’ answer to the question: “Which coherence was mostly enhanced by the EEAS?” 
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Apart from answers to the hypotheses, the research produced some other relevant 
findings. 
First of all, the EEAS lacks enough competences to establish a high degree of over-all 
agent autonomy. The application of ex ante controls, during the negotiation process 
on the establishment of the service, is the main reason for this. Even before the 
negotiations started, the European Commission succeeded in retaining important 
competences. Consequently, the EEAS currently lacks a say over its own operational 
budget. This constrains its potential to establish more European foreign policy 
coherence. Moreover, this stimulates inter-institutional turf wars.   
I have argued that the mandate of the EEAS is not vague. It is particularly detailed 
about the division of powers between the EEAS and the other actors in European 
foreign policy making. Additionally, the mandate ingrains duplication of tasks and 
responsibilities. Therefore, the mandate of the EEAS directly hampers coherence.  
In spite of a worthy building in the middle of Brussels’ centre of power, the EEAS 
still has to do without a high degree of institutional standing. As interview 
respondents pointed out, the other actors in Brussels still have to get accustomed to 
the existence of the relatively new EU foreign service.  
An interesting finding of this thesis is that the EEAS is a very fragmented 
organization. Not only is the EEAS, as Furness suggested, a ‘double agent’, but it is a 
‘multiform agent’, which behaves differently on various policy areas. Of course, to a 
certain degree this is the case with all large public sector organizations. However, the 
EEAS takes it to the extreme: contacts are extremely network-orientated. The way a 
direction is run is much dependent on the provenance of the personnel running the 
office. On some policy areas there is very tight and good contact with the 
Commission (like on trade, which is a traditional competence of the Commission), 
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while on development (equally so), the contacts with the Commission are slightly 
more difficult.  
Moreover, comprehensive common strategies on important foreign policy areas still 
lack. That is why the behaviour of the EEAS is still very procedural: it cannot yet find 
the leitmotiv in policy choices. It has, in sum, been able to increase its agent 
autonomy on certain policy areas (such as sanctions and enlargement) whereas it is 
very constrained on others (such as development and crisis management). 
Now the time has come to answer the crucial question:  
 
To what extent has the EEAS influenced European foreign policy coherence? 
 
The EEAS has improved coherence to a moderate degree and will keep doing so. 
However, a real difference in coherence it cannot make, because it does not has 
enough room to engage in agency slippage and broaden its agent autonomy: too much 
ex ante controls have been imposed on the agency by predominantly the Commission, 
itself a very ‘slipped agent’.  
The mandate of the EEAS does not provide it with much room to come with a proper 
interpretation of its competences. The HRVP is bestowed with a powerful mandate, 
but she is not capable to give substance to it, as the mandate is much too extensive to 
be executed by a single person. In the present situation, Ashton has chosen to spend 
more attention to the ‘HR’ part of her function, thereby strengthening external and 
perhaps vertical coherence but abandoning the essential role she could play in 
horizontal inter-institutional coherence as a VP of the Commission. 
With respect to the indicators of coherence, ambiguity can also be observed. On the 
one hand, the EEAS has constituted a unity of bureaucratic culture and a unity of 
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external representation. On the other hand, it has not been able to supply an absence 
of duplication of tasks and responsibilities nor an absence of inter-institutional turf 
wars. Lastly, the sense of coherence among the interview respondents was present, 
but to a very variable degree.  
We may conclude, in sum, that the EEAS has had a limited positive influence on 
European foreign policy coherence: It has been able to improve foreign policy 
coherence to a moderate degree.  
It should be kept in mind that the EEAS is still a very young institution. In the future, 
the EEAS may well be able to advance European foreign policy coherence more 
convincingly. First, it should therefore continue the process of confidence building at 
the member states and at the other European institutions.  
Lastly, a more Europhile paradigm in national politics of the member states would be 
instrumental in allowing the EEAS to increase its functions in the system of European 
foreign policy-making.  
 
 
 
Witte Wijsmuller 
Amsterdam, April-July 2013. 
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